F.  P.  A. 

Pamphlet  No.  27 
Series  of  1923-24 


X-nfernaV. 


Icl. 


The  Turco-American 
Treaty 

of 

AMITY  AND  Commerce 

SIGNED  AT  LAUSANNE 

AUGUST  6,  1923 


Report  of  the  F.  P.  A. 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE 
LAUSANNE  TREATY 

Presented  May,  ig24  to  the 
EXECUTIVE  COMMITTEE 

of  the 

Foreign  Policy  Association 

NATIONAL  HEADQUARTERS 

NINE  EAST  FORTY-FIFTH  STREET 
NEW  YORK 


Foreign  Policy  Association 

For  a Liberal  and  Constructive  American  Foreign  Policy 
NATIONAL  HEADQUARTERS 
9 East  Forty-fifth  Street,  New  York  City 


EXECUTIVE  COMMITTEE 


BRUCE  BLIVEN 
HUGHELL  FOSBROKE 
ROBERT  H.  GARDINER 
CARLTON  J.  H.  HATES 
CHARLES  P.  HOWLAND 
PAUL  U.  KELLOGG 
GEORGE  M.  LA  MONTE 


JAMES  G.  McDonald,  chairman 

MRS.  HENRY  GODDARD  LEACH 
MISS  RUTH  MORGAN 
RALPH  S.  ROUNDS 
MRS.  V.  G.  SIMKHOVITCH 
MRS.  WILLARD  D.  STRAIGHT 
MRS.  CHARLES  L.  TIFFANY 
MISS  LILLIAN  D.  WALD 


CHRISTINA  MERRIMAN,  Secretary  GEORGE  M.  LA  MONTE,  Treasurer 

ESTHER  G.  OGDEN,  Membership  Secretary 

Annual  Membership  |5  a year.  Weekly  News  Bulletin,  50c.  a year. 


MEMBERS  OF  THE  F.  P.  A.  COMMITTEE 
ON  THE  LAUSANNE  TREATY 

PHILIP  MARSHALL  BROWN : Professor  of  International 
Law  at  Princeton  University.  Former  Charge  d’Affaires 
of  American  Embassy,  Constantinople.  Author  of  For- 
eigners in  Turkey.  (Princeton,  1914.) 

SAMUEL  McCREA  CAVERT:  General  Secretary  of  the 
Federal  Council  of  the  Churches  of  Christ  in  America,  who 
has  recently  returned  from  the  Near  East. 

EDWARD  MEAD  EARLE,  Chairman:  Professor  of  His- 
tory at  Columbia  University;  author  of  Turkey,  The  Great 
Powers  and  the  Bagdad  Railway.  (New  York,  1923.) 

JACKSON  FLEMING:  A much-traveled  student  of  world 
politics,  with  a special  interest  in  the  Near  East. 

BARNETTE  MILLER;  Associate  Professor  of  History  at 
Wellesley  College.  Formerly  Professor  of  History  at  Con- 
stantinople Woman’s  College,  1909-1913;  1916-1919. 

LAURENCE  MOORE:  Acting  Secretary  of  American  Col- 
leges in  Turkey. 

E.  E.  PRATT : Formerly  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Foreign 
and  Domestic  Commerce,  U.  S.  Dept,  of  Commerce. 

W.  L.  WESTERMANN : Professor  of  History  at  Columbia 
University.  Formerly  Chief  of  the  Near  Eastern  Divi- 
sion of  the  American  Commission  to  Negotiate  Peace, 
Paris,  1919. 


The  Report  expresses  the  personal  conclusions  of  the  signers  and  is 
not  to  be  regarded  as  necessarily  representing  the  organisations  or  in- 
stitutions with  which  they  are  connected. 


The  Turco  - American  Treaty 
OF  Amity  and  Commerce 


Report  of  the  F.  P.  A. 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE 
LAUSANNE  TREATY 


TO  THE  EXECUTIVE  COMMITTEE  OF  THE  F.  P.  A.: 

The  special  Committee  appointed  by  the  Foreign  Policy  Associa- 
tion to  report  upon  the  Turco-American  Treaty  of  Amity  and 
Commerce,  signed  at  Lausanne,  August  6,  1923,  herewith  sub- 
mits the  result  of  its  investigations : 

In  spite  of  differences  of  opinion  upon  matters  of  detail,  the  members 
of  the  Committee  are  unanimously  of  the  opinion  that  the  prompt  rati- 
fication by  the  Senate  of  the  Turco-American  Treaty  would  be  in  the 
best  interests  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  peoples  of  the  Near  East. 
Our  discussions  have  demonstrated  clearly  that  it  would  be  difficult,  if 
not  impossible,  to  negotiate  a peace  with  Turkey  which  would  satisfy  all 
varieties  of  American  opinion.  The  Turco-American  Treaty  must  be 
considered  an  integral  part  of  the  Peace  of  Lausanne  which  permits  the 
resumption  of  the  affairs  of  normal  life  in  the  Near  East. 

The  Great  Need  in  the  Nesir  East  is  Peace 

Even  an  imperfect  settlement  in  the  Near  East  is  preferable  to  none. 
This  unhappy  region  of  the  world  has  been  cursed  with  an  almost  un- 
interrupted series  of  civil  and  international  wars  for  the  past  fifteen 
years — wars  which  have  been  fought  not  only  with  the  usual  weapons 
of  “civilized  warfare,”  but  with  the  other  deadly  weapons  of  expropri- 
ation, vandalism,  deportation,  massacre,  religious  persecution,  and 
almost  every  other  form  of  outrage  against  life,  liberty,  and  property. 
To  indulge  in  recriminations,  to  vent  one’s  spleen  with  bitter  diatribes 
against  one  Near  Eastern  people  or  another,  is  to  confuse  the  issues. 
What  is  worse,  it  is  to  heighten  racial  and  religious  animosities  and  to 
create  a vitiating  atmosphere  in  which  peace — however  technically  ad- 
mirable from  the  diplomatic  point  of  view — can  not  survive.  Vindictive- 
ness will  contribute  nothing  to  a solution  of  the  Near  Eastern  problem. 
No  one  people  has  been  responsible  for,  and  no  one  people  has  been 


3 


exempt  from,  the  sufferings  which  have  accompanied  the  Young  Turk 
Revolutions  of  1908-1909,  the  Turco-Italian  War  of  1911-1912,  the 
Balkan  Wars  of  1912-1913,  the  Great  War  of  1914-1918,  and  the 
Graeco-Turkish  War  of  1919-1922.  No  right-minded  American  will 
condone  the  massacre,  literally  by  the  hundreds  of  thousands,  of 
Christian  minorities  by  the  Turks.  No.  intellectually  honest  American, 
however,  will  close  his  mind  to  the  fact  that  the  Turks  themselves 
have  suffered  cruel  hardships  as  a result  of  war,  famine,  and  disease. 
These  sufferings  have  been  none  the  less  severe  because  the  less  well- 
known  in  the  United  States.  It  has  been  estimated  by  competent  au- 
thorities that  at  least  400,000  Turks  were  driven  from  their  homes  in 
Macedonia  and  Thrace  during  the  Balkan  Wars,  and  that  the  Russian 
invasions  of  Turkish  Armenia  from  1915  to  1917  led  to  the  expulsion 
of  about  800,000  Moslem  refugees.^  According  to  the  Harbord  Report, 
not  more  than  twenty  per  cent  of  all  Turkish  peasants  who  went  to 
the  Great  War  have  returned  to  their  homes,  at  least  600,000  having 
succumbed  to  typhus  alone.  “In  the  region  which  witnessed  the  ebb 
and  flow  of  the  Russian  and  Turkish  armies  the  physical  condition  of 

the  country  is  deplorable and  where  Armenians  advanced  and 

retired  with  the  Russians  their  retaliatory  cruelties  unquestionably 
rivaled  the  Turks  in  their  inhumanity.’”  The  devastation  wrought  by 
the  Greek  armies  in  their  advance  from  Smyrna  and  Brusa  is  too  well- 
known  to  require  further  comment. 

None  of  these  facts  is  cited  for  the  purpose  of  denying  the  charges 
brought  against  the  Turkish  Government  for  mistreatment  of  its  sub- 
ject peoples.  It  may  truthfully  be  asserted,  however,  that  the  excesses 
of  the  Turks  have  been  exaggerated,  and  that  similar  excesses  of  Chris- 
tian peoples  of  the  Near  East  and  of  Christian  Powers  of  the  West 
have  been  underestimated  or  passed  over  in  silence.  “If  our  aim  is 
not  simply  to  condemn,  but  to  cure,  we  can  only  modify  the  conduct  of 
the  Turks  by  altering  their  frame  of  mind,  and  our  only  means  of  doing 
that  is  to  change  our  own  attitude  towards  them.  So  long  as  we  mete 
out  one  measure  to  them,  another  to  the  Greeks  (and  Armenians),  and 
yet  a third  to  ourselves,  we  shall  have  no  moral  influence  over  them.”'* 
Atrocities  are  the  most  extreme  form  of  a bitter  racial,  religious  and 
nationalistic  struggle  between  the  Near  Eastern  peoples.  The  most  ef- 
fective way  to  terminate  this  struggle  is  to  eliminate  foreign  intrigue,  to 
effect  normal  peace-time  relationships,  and  to  take  up  the  heroic  task  of 
economic  reconstruction.  To  treat  the  Turks  as  pariahs  is  to  invite  them 
to  conduct  themselves  as  such.  To  reject  the  settlement  which  has  been 

1.  Cf.  A.  J.  Toynbee,  The  'Western  Question  in  Greece  and  Turfeej/.  (1922),  especially 
pp.  138,  191,  342.  Also  Report  of  the  Intematio^ial  Commission  to  Inquire  into  the  Causes 
and  Conduct  of  the  Balkan  Wars  (1914). 

2.  Major  General  James  G.  Harbord,  Report  of  the  American  Military  Mission  to 
Armenia  (October,  1919).  Senate  Document  No.  266,  Sixty-sixth  Congress,  First  Session. 

3.  A.  J.  Toynbee,  op.  cit.j  p.  354. 


4 


proposed  is  to  perpetuate  the  psychology  of  war,  if  not  an  actual  state 
of  war.  The  way  to  terminate  war  is  to  make  peace. 

A Dictated  Peace  Neither  Possible  Nor  Desirable 

A few  elementary  facts  must  be  understood  if  one  is  to  pass  judg- 
ment upon  the  Peace  of  Lausanne  as  a whole  or  upon  the  Turco- Amer- 
ican Treaty  as  one  of  its  parts : 

1.  The  Allies  and  the  United  States  were  not  in  a position  to  dictate 
to  Turkey  the  terms  of  a settlement.  The  Turkish  delegation  at  Lau- 
sanne had  to  be  listened  to,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  that  it  repre- 
sented a nation  victorious  in  arms  whose  major  claims  had  been  recog- 
nized by  the  Mudania  Armistice  of  October,  1922.  Whether  the  West- 
ern nations  could  have  defeated  the  Turks  is  not  the  question.  To 
retrieve  lost  military  fortunes  in  the  Near  East  would  have  required 
expenditures  of  money  and  of  lives  which  no  government  was  in  a 
position  to  undertake.  Certainly  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
which  had  never  been  at  war  with  Turkey  and  which  was  in  the  control 
of  a political  party  pledged  to  an  isolationist  policy,  could  not  have 
undertaken  to  reverse  the  military  situation.  Failure  on  the  part  of  the 
American  representatives  at  Lausanne  to  recognize  the  facts  as  they 
were,  rather  than  as  some  Americans  thought  they  ought  to  be,  would 
have  made  any  negotiations  with  the  Turks  out  of  the  question. 

2.  There  is  no  reason  for  believing  that  a peace  dictated  to  the  Turks 
by  the  Western  Powers  would  have  been  a good  peace.  On  the  con- 
trary, there  are  excellent  reasons  for  believing  that  such  a peace  would 
have  been  neither  just  nor  lasting.  A great  power’s  terms  imposed 
upon  the  small  are  almost  certain  to  be  arbitrary  and  ungenerous.  Such 
a peace,  if  accepted  at  all,  is  accepted  “in  humiliation,  under  duress,  at 
an  intolerable  sacrifice,  and  leaves  a sting,  a resentment,  and  a bitter 
memory”  which  are  the  very  negation  of  peace.'^  Such  a settlement  was 
the  Treaty  of  Sevres,  signed  under  compulsion  by  a puppet  Turkish 
Government  in  August,  1920.  By  the  terms  of  this  treaty  and  of  the 
secret  interallied  agreement  which  formed  part  of  the  settlement,  the 
former  territories  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  were  divided  with  primary 
consideration  for  the  imperialistic  interests  of  the  Great  Powers  and 
with  only  secondary  concern  for  the  wishes  and  the  welfare  of  the 
Near  Eastern  peoples.  In  spite  of  the  promise  of  “a  secure  sovereignty” 
to  the  Turkish  portions  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,^  the  Turkey  that  re- 
mained to  the  Turks  was  partitioned  into  spheres  of  interest  and  was 
tied  hand  and  foot  by  interallied  control  in  military,  financial,  com- 
mercial, judicial,  and  administrative  matters.  Allied  administration 
of  Constantinople  and  Greek  occupation  of  Smyrna  deprived  the  peas- 
antry of  Anatolia  of  their  only  satisfactory  ports  of  export  and  import. 

1.  See  President  Wilson’s  address  to  the  Senate,  January  22,  1917. 

2.  The  Fourteen  points  of  President  Wilson,  point  XII. 

5 


It  is  not  recorded  that  the  persons  now  denouncing  the  Peace  of  Lau- 
sanne raised  a voice  of  protest  against  the  injustices  of  the  Treaty  of 
Sevres.  It  is  essential,  if  we  are  to  have  peace  in  the  world,  that 
“impartial  justice  meted  out  must  involve  no  discrimination  between 
those  to  whom  we  wish  to  be  just  and  those  to  whom  we  do  not  wish 
to  be  just.’” 


3.  The  Turks  no  more  dictated  the  terms  of  the  Peace  of  Lau- 
sanne, than  did  the  Allies.  The  Turkish  delegation  were  obdurate  re- 
garding concessions,  capitulations,  and  financial  control  of  the  Allies, 
but  were  surprisingly  conciliatory  regarding  other  matters.  They  ac- 
cepted without  objection  a regime  for  the  Straits  which  is  the  most  liberal 
in  modern  times  and  which,  incidentally,  places  the  city  of  Constantinople 
practically  at  the  mercy  of  any  first-class  naval  power.  They  recog- 
nized all  of  their  debts  and  agreed  to  examine  in  most  friendly  spirit 
the  pecuniary  claims  of  American  and  Allied  nationals.  The  property 
rights  of  foreigners  in  Turkey — with  the  exception  of  certain  conces- 
sions of  doubtful  validity — have  been  scrupulously  observed.  No  com- 
pensation, it  is  true,  was  provided  for  Greek  refugees  from  Smyrna 
and  Thrace  whose  property  _was  expropriated,  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
all  claims  were  renounced  for  reparation  of  damage  wrought  by  the 
Greek  Expeditionary  Forces  in  Anatolia  from  May,  1919,  to  October, 
1922.  In  territorial  questions,  full  agreement  was  reached  early  in  the 
conference;  the  question  of  Mosul  was  to  be  settled  by  independent 
negotiations  between  Turkey  and  Great  Britain  or  by  the  arbitration 
of  the  League  of  Nations ; in  other  respects  Turkey  renounced  all 
territory  which  was  not  predominantly  Turkish  in  nationality.  Minori- 
ties were  placed  under  the  definite  protection  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Although  there  is  no  denying  the  fact  that  the  Turks  won  national 
sovereignty  from  the  Western  Powers  at  Lausanne,  that  fact,  however 
distasteful  to  some  Americans,  should  not  stand  in  the  way  of  an 
honest  examination  of  the  treaties.  The  settlement  should  stand  or 
fall  upon  its  merits. 

4.  Although  it  is  not  maintained  that  the  Peace  of  Lausanne  is 
a perfect  peace,  it  is  in  many  respects  the  best  Near  Eastern  settle- 
ment which  has  been  reached  for  a century  and  a half.  Since  the 
Russo-Turkish  Treaty  of  Kuchuk  Kainarji,  in  1774,  every  treaty  be- 
tween Turkey  and  the  European  Powers  has  been  based  upon  the 
principle  of  the  right  of  arbitrary  interference  by  any  of  the  Powers, 
upon  one  pretext  or  another,  in  the  affairs  of  the  Near  East.  This 
right  of  intervention,  made  possible  by  the  weakness  of  the  former 
Ottoman  Empire,  has  been  utilized  by  Western  Powers  to  play  off 
one  Near  Eastern  people  against  another,  with  results  disastrous  to 


Gill 

1.  President  Wilson’s  speech  at  the  Metropolitan  Opera  House,  New  York  City,  Sep- 
tember 27,  1918. 


6 


all.  It  is  an  indisputable  historical  fact  that  previous  to  the  nineteenth 
century  the  Turks  practiced  a degree  of  religious  toleration  large  com- 
pared with  that  practiced  contemporaneously  in  Western  Europe.  As 
in  Western  Europe  unorthodox  religious  beliefs  cost  the  Protestant 
or  the  Dissenter  or  the  Catholic  his  civil  and  political  privileges,  so  in 
Turkey  Christians  were  at  a disadvantage  compared  with  Moslems.  It 
was  not  until  the  nineteenth  century,  however,  that  persecution  by  the 
Turks  occurred  in  more  than  isolated  and  sporadic  instances.  Mas- 
sacres and  deportations  became  endemic  only  when  the  doctrine  of 
nationalism  spread  to  the  Near  East,  and  they  increased  in  geometric 
ratio  of  foreign  interference  and  foreign  intrigue.  The  intervention 
of  the  Great  Powers  in  the  Balkans  and  in  Turkey  has  frequently  been 
a curse  to  the  Near  Eastern  peoples  and  to  the  European  peoples  alike. 
The  Lausanne  treaties  have  established  a Turkish  national  state,  free 
from  the  Damoclean  sword  of  Western  imperialism. 

Holding  a key  position  in  the  political  geography  of  the  world,  the 
new  Turkish  state  will  have  rendered  a real  service  to  peace  if  it  can 
maintain  a stable  government  and  successfully  resist  traditional  West- 
ern diplomacy.  To  this  purpose  it  would  be  wise  for  Americans  to 
support  the  Angora  Government.  As  long  as  the  governments  in  the 
Balkan  and  Anatolian  peninsulas  are  weak  and  ineffective  and  con- 
stantly flying  at  each  other’s  throats  with  the  support  of  the  Great 
Powers,  no  satisfactory  relations — diplomatic,  missionary,  educational, 
archaeological,  philanthropic,  or  commercial, — can  be  maintained  be- 
tween America  and  the  Near  East.  Political  stabilization  in  Greece 
and  Turkey  will  be  one  of  the  most  effective  ways  of  preventing  con- 
flicts between  the  Near  Eastern  peoples,  as  well  as  conflicts  between  the 
European  Powers  which  have  been  engaged  in  keen  competition  for 
economic,  political,  and  strategic  advantages  in  the  Levant.  In  this 
connection  it  is  of  significance  to  point  out  that  whereas  France  and 
Great  Britain  were  at  swords’  points  on  Near  Eastern  questions  almost 
continuously  from  October,  1914,  to  July,  1923,  their  relationships 
have  been  materially  improved  since  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  of 
Lausanne, 

The  Scope  and  Purpose  of  the  Turco- American  Treaty 

It  was  not  and  could  not  have  been  the  purpose  of  the  American 
representatives  at  Lausanne  to  unmake  the  sordid  history  of  the  Near 
East  from  1914  to  1923 — the  deportations  and  massacres  of  Armenians, 
wholesale  extermination  of  populations  by  war  and  disease,  predatory 
imperialism  violating  legitimate  national  aspirations,  the  ill-advised 
Greek  invasion  of  Anatolia  followed  by  another  cruel  war  of  devas- 
tation, the  totally  unacceptable  peace  at  Sevres,  the  charred  ruins  of 
Smyrna  and  Afiun  Karahissar  and  Eskishehr.  These  damages  were 


7 


irreparable.  Our  inability  or  unwillingness  to  participate  fully  in  the 
discussion  of  peace  terms  for  Turkey  because  we  had  never  been 
technically  at  war  with  the  Ottoman  Empire ; our  consent  to  the 
Greek  occupation  of  Smyrna;  our  refusal — right  or  wrong — to 
accept  a mandate  for  Armenia;  all  these  reasons  made  it  impossible 
for  us  to  retrace  the  various  steps  in  American  policy  in  the  Near 
East  since  1917.  Even  the  advocates  of  cooperation  in  Europe,  it 
may  safely  be  said,  would  hesitate  to  embroil  the  United  States  in 
the  present  Near  Eastern  situation. 

The  only  course  the  American  delegation  at  Lausanne  could  pur- 
sue was  the  course  it  chose.  Faced  with  a treaty  between  Turkey  and 
the  Allies  which  abandoned  the  Capitulations  and  other  exterritorial 
rights  and  which  recognized  the  National  Government  of  Angora, 
it  would  have  been  futile  to  do  otherwise  than  to  secure  most-favored- 
nation  treatment  for  American  interests.  Aware  of  the  temper  of 
American  public  opinion,  it  would  have  been  out  of  the  question  for  the 
American  delegation,  apart  from  the  European  Powers,  to  assume  re- 
sponsibility for  the  purely  political  questions  of  boundaries,  the  status 
of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits,  or  the  establishment  of  an  Ar- 
menian Republic.  What  Mr.  Grew^  signed  at  Lausanne  was  a Treaty 
of  Amity  and  Commerce  designed  to  secure  to  Americans  the  same 
rights  as  were  secured  by  the  Allied  Treaty  to  Britons,  Frenchmen, 
Italians,  and  the  others.  It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  upon  what  basis 
we  could  justly  claim  more  or  by  what  methods  we  could  enforce 
any  such  additional  claim. 

In  general,  the  attacks  upon  the  Treaty  are  launched  with  two 
alleged  justifications:  first,  that  we  have  abandoned  our  rights;  sec- 
ond, that  we  have  ignored  our  responsibilities.  It  is  sometimes  inti- 
mated, also,  that  no  diplomatic  relationships  with  Turkey — except, 
presumably,  such  as  are  based  upon  force  or  the  threat  of  force — 
are  desirable. 

As  regards  American  rights  in  Turkey,  they  may  be  classified 
under  the  following  heads : regime  of  the  Capitulations ; economic ; mis- 
sionary, educational,  and  philanthropic;  archaeological.  American 
responsibilities,  we  take  it,  are  concerned  with  the  protection  of 
minorities  and  with  the  status  of  Armenia. 

Abolition  of  the  Capitulations 

The  Turco- American  Treaty  of  August  6,  1923,  surrenders  the 
exterritorial  rights  which  American  citizens,  in  common  with  other 
foreigners,  possessed  in  Turkey  before  October  1,  1914,  on  the  basis 
of  most-favored-nation  treatment.  Under  the  Capitulations,  Ameri- 

1.  Mr.  Joseph  Grew,  Minister  to  Switzerland,  was  the  American  observer  at  the  second 
Lausanne  Conference. 


8 


cans  formerly  enjoyed  immunities  from  the  jurisdiction  of  Turkish 
financial  officials,  the  Turkish  police,  and  the  Turkish  courts.  Under 
the  proposed  treaty,  Americans  in  Turkey  will  enjoy  no  such  im- 
munities. This  is  admittedly  the  surrender  of  an  important 
American  privilege,  but  it  is  not  the  first  instance  in  which  such  privileges 
have  been  surrendered.^ 

It  is  not  certain,  however,  that  the  former  regime  of  the  Capitula- 
tions was  justified  on  the  grounds  of  either  expediency  or  right.  The 
exemption  of  foreigners  from  taxation  and  the  veto  of  foreign  gov- 
ernments over  increases  in  the  Ottoman  customs  duties  assisted  in 
the  perpetual  pauperization  of  the  Turkish  Treasury  and  placed  the 
Sublime  Porte  at  the  mercy  of  European  diplomatists  and  European 
financiers.  As  a result  of  the  privileged  juridical  status  of  foreigners 
the  grossest  abuses  arose.  Foreign  consuls  were  exalted  officials  who 
usurped  the  place,  in  large  measure,  of  the  Turkish  authorities.  For- 
eigners were  so  completely  exempt  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Turk- 
ish police  that  they  came,  in  effect,  to  be  regarded  as  subject  to  no 
law.  Consciously  or  unconsciously,  they  not  infrequently  indicated 
an  utter  disregard  and  contempt  for  many  of  the  police  regulations. 
The  Turkish  authorities  often  found  themselves  quite  helpless  under 
the  most  trying  and  exasperating  circumstances.  The  most  notorious 
instance  of  this  helplessness  was  the  impotence  of  the  police  in  dealing 
with  the  hotels,  cafes,  gambling  houses,  saloons,  dance-halls,  and  other 
pleasure  resorts  which  flourished  in  defiance  of  Moslem  sensibilities. 

Even  before  the  Great  War,  the  European  Powers  recognized  that 
a system  which  permitted  of  such  abuses  must  come  to  an  end.  They 
bargained  with  the  Turks  in  Oriental  fashion  for  valuable  conces- 
sions and  other  special  privileges  as  the  price  of  their  abrogation. 

The  discredited  regime  was  doomed,  and  it  was  no  surprise  to  any- 
one when,  upon  entering  the  Great  War,  the  Ottoman  Government 
declared  the  Capitulations  at  an  end.  The  Treaty  of  Sevres  of  August 
20,  1920,  sought  to  reimpose  the  system  of  the  Capitulations,  but  by 
Article  VI  of  the  National  Pact  the  Nationalist  Government  0\f 
Turkey  had  previously  made  it  plain  that  this  was  one  point  upon 
which  Mustapha  Kemal  and  his  followers  would  not  compromise. 
The  first  Lausanne  Conference  broke  up  largely  because  of  the  de- 
termination of  the  Turks  to  fight  rather  than  to  surrender  upon  what 
they  considered  a vital  issue.  The  Allies  were  not  disposed  to  resume 
hostilities,  with  the  result  that  the  second  Conference  terminated  in 
the  abrogation  of  the  Capitulations  in  every  respect. 

1.  Exterritorial  rights  in  Japan  have  long  since  been  surrendered  by  the  United 
States.  A treaty  was  signed  on  December  16,  1920,  between  the  United  States  and  Siam 
providing  for  the  aboiition  (as  regards  the  United  States)  of  exterritorial  privileges  in 
Siam.  See  42 — 17.  S.  Statutes  at  Large. 


9 


The  United  States  could  not  contend  single-handed  for  what  the  Eu- 
ropean Powers  had  renounced.  We  can  not  now  properly  claim  priv- 
ileges greater  than  those  enjoyed  by  nationals  of  the  Allied  Powers. 
The  Turks,  with  the  best  of  good  will  toward  us,  can  not  be  expected 
to  concede  to  Americans  a special  status  which  they  have  refused  to 
grant  Europeans.  Such  being  the  situation,  inexorable  logic  de- 
manded that  the  United  States  should  define  its  relations  with  Turkey 
in  treaty  form  in  order  not  to  be  placed  at  a serious  disadvantage. 
The  Treaty  of  August  6,  1923,  together  with  the  accompanying  uni- 
lateral declarations  of  the  Turkish  delegates  at  Lausanne,  grants  to 
nationals  of  the  United  States  most-favored-nation  treatment  Avith 
nationals  of  the  Great  Powers  as  defined  by  the  Treaty  of  July  24, 
1923.  The  juridical  status  of  Americans,  therefore,  is  as  follows: 

1.  Although  Consular  Courts  are  abolished,  Article  VIII  of  the  Turco- 
American  Treaty  provides  that  Consuls  retain  their  special  rights  “in  mat- 
ters of  civil  status  according  to  international  law  or  special  agreements.” 
This  provision  is  general  enough  to  permit  of  liberal  interpretation  and 
elaboration  under  tactful  diplomacy  and  cautious  experiment. 

2.  All  questions  of  personal  status,  such  as  marriage,  divorce,  dowry, 
paternity,  adoption,  guardianship,  inheritance,  etc.,  are  left  to  the  juris- 
diction of  American  tribunals  or  other  competent  American  authorities 
outside  of  Turkey. 

3.  According  to  a special  declaration  of  July  24,  1923,  issued  by  the 
Turkish  delegation  at  Lausanne  in  connection  with  the  new  system  of 
judicial  administration : “In  civil  or  commercial  matters,  all  references  to 
arbitration  and  clauses  in  agreements  providing  therefor  are  allowed,  and 
the  arbitral  decisions  rendered  in  pursuance  thereof  shall  be  executed  on 
being  signed  by  the  President  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance,  who  shall  not 
refuse  his  signature  unless  the  decision  shall  be  contrary  to  public  order.” 
Experience  alone  will  demonstrate  the  value  of  this  provision,  but  it  would 
seem  to  offer  great  possibilities  for  the  settlement  of  litigation  by  foreigners 
outside  the  Turkish  courts. 

4.  Paragraph  three  of  the  same  declaration  provides  that:  “In  cases  of 
minor  offenses,  release  on  bail  shall  always  be  ordered,  unless  this  entails 
danger  to  public  safety  or  unless  such  provisional  release  is  likely  to  im- 
pede the  investigation  of  the  case.” 

5.  The  Turkish  Government  obligates  itself  to  employ  a number  of  legal 
advisers  selected  from  a list  prepared  by  the  Permanent  Court  of  Interna- 
tional Justice.  These  advisers  shall  observe  the  administration  of  justice, 
receive  complaints,  make  suggestions  to  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  and  assist 
in  the  drafting  of  legislation.  Domiciliary  visits  on  foreigners  by  the  police 
are  to  be  reported  to  these  advisers. 

6.  Foreigners  are  guaranteed  equality  of  treatment  with  Turkish  na- 
tionals— that  is,  they  shall  not  be  discriminated  against  in  the  administra- 
tion of  justice. 

It  is  dear  that  these  judicial  guarantees  are  not  comparable  to 
to  those  enjoyed  by  Americans  before  the  Great  War.  Moreover, 
they  are  to  continue  for  only  seven  years  unless  permitted  to  remain 


10 


in  force  by  the  Turkish  authorities  subject  to  abrogation  after  six 
months’  notice.  It  is  also  apparent  that  after  the  long  period  of  wars 
and  administrative  demoralization  in  Turkey,  it  will  require  a long 
time  to  train  competent  executive  and  judicial  officials.  The  admin- 
istrative inexperience  of  most  of  the  Nationalists  and  the  scarcity  of 
trained  functionaries  of  intelligence  and  probity  will  place  a heavy 
responsibility  upon  Turkey.  It  is  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  this 
Committee  that  it  would  have  been  highly  desirable  in  every  way,  for 
the  Turks  no  less  than  foreigners,  if  some  transitional  system  had 
been  established  during  which  the  Angora  Government  might  have 
prepared  itself  for  the  full  assumption  of  police  and  judicial  powers. 
Turkish  suspicion  of  European  intentions  is  so  deep-rooted,  how- 
ever, that  no  such  compromise  at  Lausanne  was  possible. 

Whatever  one  may  think  of  the  regime  of  the  Capitulations  per  se, 
one  must  admit  that  it  can  be  re-established  in  Turkey  only  by  force. 
No  other  nations  are  prepared  to  go  to  war  with  Turkey  for  the 
purpose  and  it  is  unthinkable  that  the  United  States  should  assume  this 
Quixotic  role  unassisted.  To  insist  that  Americans  still  enjoy  ex- 
territorial privileges  under  the  Treaty  of  1830  is  to  close  our  eyes  to 
the  facts.  Such  a stand  would  be  ignored  by  Turkey  and  would  be 
resented  by  the  European  Powers.  There  remains  only  the  alterna- 
tive of  a graceful  acceptance  and  the  securing,  by  wise  diplomacy,  of 
a maximum  of  legitimate  advantages  for  American  interests  in  Turkey. 

American  Economic  Rights  Under  the  Treaty 

Sweeping  assertions  have  been  made  that  the  Treaty  with  Turkey 
is  “humiliating  and  purposeless”  and  “surrenders  every  American 
right  in  Turkey.”  Nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth.  The 
abolition  of  the  Capitulations,  to  be  sure,  will  remove  the  exemptions 
from  taxation  which  American  business  formerly  enjoyed  in  the  Otto- 
man Empire.  Inasmuch,  however,  as  no  foreigners  are  hereafter  to 
enjoy  such  exemptions,  American  interests  are  placed  at  no  disad- 
vantage as  regards  other  interests.  Americans  are  to  enjoy  most- 
favored-nation  treatment  as  regards  import  and  export  duties,  patents 
and  trade  marks,  the  transportation  of  goods  and  the  free  entry  of 
merchant  vessels,  etc.,  in  accordance  with  the  traditional  policy  of  the 
open  door.  A convention  has  been  negotiated  which  satisfies,  it  is 
understood,  all  legitimate  pecuniary  claims  of  American  citizens  for 
damages  resulting  from  operations  of  war  and  other  causes  for  which 
the  Turkish  Government  may  be  considered  responsible.  Further- 
more the  Treaty  confers  upon  American  commercial  corporations  the 
right  to  hold  property  in  their  own  names,  a departure  from  Ottoman 
custom  which  will  materially  expedite  the  transaction  of  business.  It 
is  the  general  opinion  of  American  business  men  in  Turkey  that  the 

11 


Nationalist  Government  should  be  given  an  opportunity  to  establish 
a stable  administration  without  the  interference  of  foreign  powers. 
Commercial  interests  desire  nothing  more  than  an  end  of  war  in  the 
Near  East  and  the  re-establishment  of  normal  economic  relationships. 

The  Committee  has  received  an  illuminating  letter  from  a promi- 
nent American  merchant  in  Constantinople,  a quotation  from  which 
will  indicate  the  point  of  view  of  those  who  are  now  doing  business 
with  the  Turks:  “Naturally,  there  are  many  whose  interests  would  be 
served  by  the  non-ratiftcation  of  the  Treaty,  chiefly  our  European 
competitors  for  trade  here.  Of  late,  we  have  equalled  or  exceeded 
British  imports;  and  if  the  new  British  Parliament  ratifies  and  we  do 
not — and  all  of  the  Allies  will  ratify  sooner  or  later — we  shall  be 
placed  at  a great  disadvantage  nationally,  and  individually  we  shall 
have  a hard  time  to  get  along.”  It  has  been  stated  by  opponents  of 
the  Treaty  that  American  trade  with  Turkey  is  insignificant  in  volume, 
that  it  holds  out  no  hope  for  the  future  and  that,  consequently,  it  may 
be  ignored  as  a factor  in  the  situation.  This  opinion  does  not  con- 
form with  the  facts.  In  1900,  American  exports  to  Turkey  amounted 
to  only  $50,000;  in  1913,  they  had  risen  to  $3,500,000  and  in  1920  to 
$42,200,000.  Imports  into  the  United  States  from  Turkey,  includ- 
ing certain  important  raw  materials,  increased  from  $22,100,000  in 
1913  to  $39,600,000  in  1920.  From  1919  to  1922  American  trade  with 
Constantinople  alone  averaged  over  $30,000,000  annually.*  While 
one  cannot  definitely  predict  that  there  will  be  a continued  increase  in 
Turco-American  trade,  one  can  predict  with  certainty  that  the  de- 
nunciation of  the  Treaty  will  do  nothing  to  promote  such  an  increase. 

According  to  Article  X of  the  Treaty  “merchant  and  war  vessels 
and  aircraft  of  the  United  States  enjoy  complete  liberty  of  naviga- 
tion and  passage  in  the  Dardanelles,  the  Sea  of  Marmora  and  the  Bos- 
phorus on  a basis  of  equality  with  similar  craft  of  the  most-favored- 
nation,  subject  to  the  rules  relating  to  such  navigation  and  passage  in 
the  Straits  Convention  of  Lausanne  of  July  24,  1923.”  An  exami- 
nation of  the  Straits  Convention  discloses  that  American  merchant 
vessels,  yachts,  fishing  vessels  and  non-military  aircraft  enjoy  unre- 
stricted freedom  of  navigation  of  the  Straits,  without  any  formalities 
except  international  sanitary  regulations  and  without  any  tax  or  other 
charge  except  such  as  may  be  freely  paid  for  towage,  pilotage,  and 
other  similar  services.  These  privileges  are  guaranteed  American  ves- 
sels in  time  of  war,  as  in  time  of  peace,  with  the  single  exception  of  a 

1.  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy  have  already  ratified  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne  and  with 
the  formal  approval  of  Japan  which  is  expected  in  a few  days,  the  Treaty  will  come  into 
force.  New  York  Times,  May  16,  1924. 

2.  There  has  been  a falling  off  in  Turco-American  trade  during  1923,  because  of 
the  interallied  military  evacuation  and  post-war  economic  depression  throughout  the  Near 
Fast. 


12 


war  between  the  United  States  and  Turkey,  in  which  case,  of  course, 
American  vessels  would  be  subject  to  seizure  if  not  adequately  pro- 
tected. In  spite  of  these  indisputable  facts,  a recent  memorandum  ad- 
vocating rejection  of  the  Treaty  unblushingly  states  that  the  Darda- 
nelles “may  be  closed  at  the  will  of  the  Turks,  as  was  done  in  1914 
and  on  many  other  occasions.”  The  most  charitable  thing  which  may 
be  said  of  this  statement  is  that  it  is  ambiguous.  If  the  implication  is 
that  the  Turks  may  legally  close  the  Straits,  it  is  inaccurate.  If  the 
implication  is  that  they  may  arbitrarily  close  the  Straits  by  military 
force,  it  overlooks  completely  the  elaborate  regulations  of  the  Straits 
Convention  for  the  complete  demilitarization  of  the  Dardanelles,  the 
Sea  of  Marmora,  and  the  Bosphorus,  and  of  the  islands  which  control 
those  waterways.  It  ignores,  also,  the  fact  that  the  administration  of 
these  regulations  is  to  be  in  the  hands  of  an  international  Commis- 
sion of  the  Straits  upon  which  the  United  States,  if  it  so  chooses,  may 
be  represented. 

At  the  instance  of  Mr.  Richard  Washburn  Child,  the  American 
observer  at  the  first  Lausanne  Conference,  the  Straits  Convention 
likewise  permitted  free  passage  through  the  Dardanelles  and  the  Bos- 
phorus of  American  war  vessels  to  a tonnage  equal  to  that  of  the 
most  powerful  single  fleet  of  the  Black  Sea  countries.  It  was  the 
contention  of  Mr.  Child  that  this  privilege  was  desired  by  the  United 
States  in  order  “to  police  the  free  seas,  to  protect  its  citizens  and 
ships  wherever  they  might  be,  to  suppress  piracy  and  other  menaces, 
and  to  act  at  times  for  the  public  good  and  to  give  relief  to  suffering, 
just  as  ships  of  war  have  recently  acted  in  the  Near  East.”  ^ Insofar 
as  American  commercial  interests  and  philanthropic  enterprises  are 
centered  in  Samsun  and  other  Black  Sea  ports  of  Turkey,  they  will  be 
under  the  protection  of  American  destroyers  should  the  Government 
elect  to  despatch  them.  It  may  safely  be  said  that  the  Straits  Con- 
vention of  Lausanne  is  the  most  liberal  international  agreement  which 
has  yet  regulated  navigation  in  those  waters. 

It  is  desirable  to  make  clear  at  this  point  that  there  are  several 
members  of  this  Committee  who  are  fearful  of  the  existing  tendency 
of  Governments  to  promote  actively  by  diplomatic  and  military  means 
the  so-called  “economic  interests”  of  the  nation  in  foreign  territory. 
Were  there  any  evidence  in  this  Treaty  that  the  Department  of  State  had 
permitted  its  Near  Eastern  policy  to  be  determined  by  an  economic  quid 
pro  quo,  several  members  of  this  Committee  would  be  inclined  to  advo- 
cate the  reopening  of  negotiations  with  Turkey  on  a different  basis. 
There  is  no  such  evidence,  however,  and  the  Secretary  of  State  has 

1.  Lausanne  Conference  on  Near  Eastern  Affairs,  1922-lSZS.  Records  of  Proceedings 
and  Draft  Terms  of  Peace.  (London,  1923)  p.  146. 

13 


recently  denied  that  the  negotiation  of  the  Turco-American  Treaty 
was  conducted  in  a spirit  of  economic  imperialism.  In  his  speech  be- 
fore the  Council  of  Foreign  Relations,  at  New  York,  January  23, 
1924,  Mr.  Hughes  said:  “At  no  stage  in  the  negotiations  was  the 
American  position  determined  by  the  so-called  Chester  concession. 
This  had  been  granted  before  negotiations  of  our  treaty  with  Turkey 
had  been  begun.  This  Government  took  no  part  in  securing  it;  this 
Government  made  no  barter  of  any  of  its  rights  for  this  or  any  other 
concession.  Our  position  is  a simple  one.  We  maintain  the  policy  of 
the  open  door,  or  equality  of  commercial  opportunity;  we  demand  a 
square  deal  for  our  nationals.  We  objected  to  the  alleged  concession 
to  the  Turkish  Petroleum  Gompany,  owned  by  foreign  interests,  be- 
cause it  had  never  been  validly  granted,  and  in  so  doing  we  stood  for 
American  rights  generally  and  not  for  any  particular  interest.” 

The  Treaty  cund  Archaeological  Reseaurch 

With  respect  to  American  rights  in  archaeological  research  in 
Turkey,  the  Treaty  provides  that  American  archaeologists,  in  common 
with  other  Americans,  shall  enjoy  most-favored-nation  treatment. 
Under  the  terms  of  Article  III,^  they  would  be  permitted,  subject  to 
Turkish  regulations,  to  conduct  researches  unless  such  researches 
should  be  forbidden  to  all  foreigners.  This  means  that  the  Turkish 
law  upon  antiquities  shall  apply  to  discoveries  made  by  Americans 
who  have  obtained  permission  from  the  Turkish  Government  to  ex- 
cavate— namely,  that  the  antiquities  discovered  shall  be  the  property 
of  the  Turkish  Government,  subject  to  such  arrangements  for  division 
of  the  discoveries  as  may  be  made  by  mutual  agreement  of  the  exca- 
vators and  the  Turkish  authorities.^ 

It  is  true,  of  course,  that  as  with  all  undeveloped  peoples,  vandalism 
and  lack  of  appreciation  of  materials  of  scientific  value  are  more  prev- 
alent in  Turkey  than  in  more  developed  countries.  There  is  also 
constant  danger  that  valuable  historical  materials  may  be  lost.  But 
it  is  not  true  that  “there  are  no  Turkish  archaeologists.”  The  splen- 
did museum  built  up  at  Constantinople  in  the  past  generation  by  the 
well-known  archaeologist,  Osman  Hamdi  Bey,  who  died  a few  years 
ago,  is  sufficient  refutation  of  this  misrepresentation.  The  work  of 
Hamdi  Bey,  an  archaeologist  of  high  international  repute,  is  now 
being  carried  on  by  his  brother,  Halil  Edheim  Bey. 

1.  Although  Article  III  does  not  specifically  refer  to  archaeological  research,  it  pro- 
vides that:  ‘‘They  (nationals  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties)  may,  under  the  local 
laws  and  regulations  in  force,  engage  in  every  kind  of  profession,  commerce,  etc.,  not 
forbidden  by  law  to  all  foreigners.”  The  American  delegation  at  Lausanne  understood 
that  this  provision  included  the  right  of  Americans  to  engage  in  archaeological  research 
under  the  existing  Turkish  law  governing  excavations. 

2.  Under  the  Italian  and  Greek  laws  concerning  excavations,  the  same  conditions 
obtain. 


14 


At  present,  two  large  and  important  enterprises  of  American  arch- 
aeological research  in  Turkey  are  being  refused  permission  to  work 
in  Anatolia.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  materials  excavated  at  Sardis 
under  a firman  of  the  old  Turkish  Government  were  taken  away 
during  the  Greek  occupation  of  1919-1922.  The  bulk  of  these  ma- 
terials is  Lydian-Anatolian  and  not  Greek,  and  its  removal  by  the 
Greek  authorities  is  hardly  to  be  commended.  About  a month  before 
the  Greek  evacuation  of  Smyrna  the  materials  in  question  were  shipped 
to  the  United  States,  the  prompt  action  of  American  archaeologists 
interested  in  the  enterprise,  having  thus  saved  it  from  destruction  in 
the  Smyrna  fire. 

It  is  the  contention  of  the  Angora  Government  that  these  materials 
should  now  be  returned  to  the  museum  at  Gonstantinople.  If  the 
Sardis  materials  are  not  returned  Americans  may  be  seriously  handi- 
capped in  conducting  excavations  in  Anatolia. 

Religious,  Philanthropic  and  Educational  Institutions 

No  American  interest  in  Turkey,  it  may  safely  be  said,  makes  a 
wider  appeal  than  our  schools,  colleges  and  orphanages  and  religious 
or  philanthropic  institutions.  The  role  which  they  have  played  in 
healing  the  wounds  of  feuds  and  wars,  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  lay- 
ing the  foundations  of  racial  and  international  conciliation,  on  the 
other,  is  one  of  which  every  American  may  be  justly  proud.  Sir 
William  Ramsay,  a distinguished  British  Orientalist,  has  stated  that 
American  institutions  have  done  more  to  bring  about  a just  settle- 
ment of  the  troublesome  Eastern  question  than  all  the  statesmen  of 
Europe  combined.  Professor  George  Young,  former  secretary  of  the 
British  Embassy  at  Constantinople,  and  Professor  Arnold  J.  Toynbee, 
a reputable  British  historian  of  the  Near  East,  have  testified,  as  have 
many  other  students  of  the  Near  Eastern  question,  regarding  the 
great  work  which  the  American  schools  and  colleges  have  done  in 
breaking  down  racial  and  religious  prejudices  among  the  younger  gen- 
erations. American  schools  in  Turkey  have  been  appropriately  called 
“oases  of  peace  in  a desert  of  discord.”  It  is  the  unanimous  opinion 
of  this  Committee  that  the  cessation  of  these  educational  and  philan- 
thropic activities  would  be  the  betrayal  of  a great  trust  and  the  aban- 
donment of  America’s  greatest  opportunity  for  humanitarian  work 
in  the  Near  East.  There  never  was  a period,  in  fact,  when  their 
presence  was  more  needed  than  during  the  coming  critical  years  of 
economic  reconstruction  and  political  readjustment. 

The  officials  of  American  schools,  missions,  and  hospitals  in  Turkey 
are  aware  that  no  detailed  regulations,  national  or  international  in 
character,  will  be  as  effective  in  the  prosecution  of  their  work  as  the 


15 


good  will  of  the  Turks.  Personal  relationships,  much  more  than 
judicial  capitulations,  or  treaty  provisions,  are  of  importance  in  main- 
taining harmony  with  the  Turkish  Government.  As  has  been  stated 
by  the  Turks  themselves,  “American  missionaries  and  teachers  should 
not  object  to  the  abolition  of  the  Capitulations  because  they  have  not 
needed  recourse  to  the  courts.”  No  amount  of  diplomatic  or  military 
force  would  be  of  avail  if  the  Turks  lost  confidence  in  the  good  in- 
tentions of  the  American  institutions  themselves. 

The  Turks  have  indicated  their  desire  that  the  American  schools 
and  colleges  should  continue  their  work.  As  Ismet  Pasha,  now  Prime 
Minister  of  the  Angora  Government,  said  at  Lausanne,  they  “want 
these  institutions  to  stay  and  have  no  intention  of  adopting  laws  that 
will  embarrass  the  continuation  of  the  admirable  American  philan- 
thropic work  among  their  people.”  (One  of  Ismet  Pasha’s  brothers 
is  at  present  a student  in  Robert  College  in  Constantinople.)  More 
recently  at  Angora,  in  an  interview  with  an  official  representative  of 
the  American  colleges,  Ismet  Pasha  reiterated  his  Lausanne  declara- 
tion, and  other  cabinet  ministers  confirmed  this  profession  of  good 
faith.  Americans  in  Turkey  know,  and  the  Turks  themselves  must  con- 
fess, that  the  resources  of  the  peoples,  both  Moslem  and  Christian,  are 
too  meagre  to  provide  institutions  adequate  for  the  educational  train- 
ing and  the  moral  advancement  of  the  people  in  whose  hands  will  lie 
the  future  of  the  Near  East.  The  Turks  know,  also,  that  our  schools, 
missions,  and  hospitals  in  the  Near  East — unlike  those  of  some  other 
foreign  countries — are  without  government  subsidies  and  have  never 
been  used  as  agencies  of  political  and  economic  penetration.  They 
have  held  our  teachers,  physicians  and  missionaries  in  high  esteem  as 
men  and  women  of  generous  sympathies,  good  sense  and  tact.  Left  to 
themselves,  these  Americans  have  been  able  in  the  past,  through  per- 
sonal negotiations,  to  compose  official  or  private  differences  with  the 
Turkish  Government.  It  is  on  the  basis  of  their  good  record,  and  on 
the  basis  of  their  great  promise  for  future  service,  that  the  American 
institutions  in  Turkey  rely  for  favorable  treatment  by  the  new  Turkish 
Administration. 

The  United  States  Government  has  maintained  its  defense  of  Ameri- 
can schools  and  philanthropic  institutions  in  Turkey  upon  the  general 
ground  of  most-favored-nation  treatment,  but  there  has  never  been  any 
specific  treaty  between  these  two  countries  that  provided  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  such  institutions.  This  has  always  been  by  act  of  courtesy 
of  the  Ottoman  Government  on  behalf  of  a friendly  people.  The  Sultans, 
of  their  own  free  will,  usually  granted  the  institutions  certain  immunities 
from  jurisdiction  as  well  as  authority  to  carry  on  their  work  and  the 
United  States  Government  has  always  permitted  the  application  of  Otto- 


16 


man  municipal  law  in  the  regulation  of  the  status  and  work  of  these  in- 
stitutions insofar  as  this  has  not  interfered  with  the  personal  rights  of 
Americans  claimed  under  most-favored-nation  agreement.  Irades,  or 
decrees  of  the  Sultan,  conferring  specific  rights  of  immunity  to  certain 
American  schools  in  Turkey  have  also  been  the  freewill  grants  of  the 
Ottoman  Government  without  treaty  coercion.  It  was  in  accordance 
with  precedent,  therefore,  that  the  Turkish  delegation  at  Lausanne  re- 
fused to  incorporate  in  the  treaties  with  the  Allies  and  the  United 
States  specific  provisions  designed  to  establish  in  international,  rather 
than  merely  Turkish  law,  the  special  position  of  foreign  institutions. 
Their  refusal  in  this  respect  was  based  also  upon  fear — justified  by 
many  a bitter  experience  in  the  past — that  like  guarantees,  under  inter- 
national agreement,  to  certain  European  Powers  would  be  utilized  as 
a pretext  for  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Turkey.  What 
they  were  unwilling  to  grant  to  the  Allies,  the  Turks  hardly  could 
grant  to  us. 

Nevertheless,  on  August  4,  1923,  Ismet  Pasha  addressed  to  Mr. 
Grew  a letter  promising  to  American  institutions  in  Turkey  liberal 
treatment  under  Turkish  law.  The  letter  in  question,  which  is  identi- 
cal with  a letter  addressed  to  each  of  the  Allied  Powers  at  Lausanne, 
July  24,  1923,  is  as  follows: 

Excellency : 

With  reference  to  the  Convention  regarding  the  conditions  of  residence 
and  business  signed  at  Lausanne  to-day,  and  following  on  the  decision  taken 
by  the  First  Committee  at  its  meeting  of  the  19th  May,  1923,  regarding  the 
substitution  of  the  declaration,  which  was  to  have  been  annexed  to  the  said 
Convention,  by  an  exchange  of  letters,  I have  the  honor  to  declare,  in  the 
name  of  my  Government,  that  the  latter  will  recognize  the  existence  of 
American  religious,  scholastic  and  medical  establishments,  as  well  as  of 
charitable  institutions  recognized  as  existing  in  Turkey  before  the  30th  Octo- 
ber, 1914,  and  that  it  will  favorably  examine  the  case  of  other  similar 
American  institutions  actually  existing  in  Turkey  at  the  date  of  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  signed  toda}",  with  a view  to  regularize  their  position. 

The  establishments  and  institutions  mentioned  above  will,  as  regards  fiscal 
charges  of  every  kind,  be  treated  on  a footing  of  equality  with  similar 
Turkish  establishments  and  institutions,  and  will  be  subject  to  the  ad- 
ministrative arrangements  of  a public  character,  as  well  as  to  the  laws  and 
regulations  governing  the  latter.  It  is,  however,  understood  that  the 
Turkish  Government  will  take  into  account  the  conditions  under  which 
these  establishments  carry  on  their  work,  and,  insofar  as  schools  are  con- 
cerned, the  practical  organization  of  their  teaching  arrangements. 

I avail,  etc., 

[Signed]  M.  ISMET. 

There  is  one  respect  in  which  the  Committee  would  desire  to  see 
this  declaration,  or  a clause  in  the  Treaty  itself,  made  more  exact. 
Commercial  corporations  are  guaranteed  certain  specific  rights  under 

17 


the  Treaty,  including  the  right  to  hold  property  in  their  corporate 
capacity.  Similar  rights  are  not  guaranteed  corporations  organized 
for  religious  and  charitable  purposes.  The  property  owned  by  Robert 
College  at  Constantinople,  for  example,  must  continue  to  be  held  in 
the  name  of  an  individual  rather  than  in  the  name  of  its  Trustees. 
We  believe,  however,  that  this  distinction  may  be  removed  by  sup- 
plementary negotiations  between  Washington  and  Angora,  without 
requiring  an  actual  amendment  to  the  pending  Treaty.  As  Dr.  Gates 
has  stated  in  a recent  communication,  the  American  institutions  have 
received  assurances  from  the  Turkish  Government  that  American 
property  rights  will  be  satisfactorily  regularized  immediately  after 
the  resumption  of  normal  diplomatic  relations. 

The  officials  of  the  American  educational  institutions  are  ready  to 
accept  the  conditions  and  carry  on  their  work  in  Turkey.  Dr.  Mary 
Mills  Patrick,  who  has  been  engaged  for  more  than  half  a century 
in  missionary  work  in  Turkey,  and  who  for  almost  thirty-five  years 
has  been  President  of  Constantinople  Woman’s  College,  joins  with 
Dr.  Caleb  Gates,  President  of  Robert  College,  in  declaring  in  favor 
of  ratification  of  the  Turco-American  Treaty.  Dr.  Gates,  for  ex- 
ample, has  said,  “As  to  the  Treaty  itself,  what  does  it  give  us?  It 
gives  us  the  good  will  of  the  Turks  instead  of  their  ill  will.  That 
is  certainly  worth  something  to  all  who  live  and  work  in  Turkey. 
To  them  the  Treaty  affords  an  opportunity  to  work  out  the  problems 
which  their  life  in  Turkey  presents  and  to  exercise  what  influence 
they  possess  in  favor  of  the  right.  It  still  leaves  an  opportunity  for 
missionaries  and  educators  to  try  to  make  the  principles  of  righteous- 
ness known  and  practiced  in  Turkey.”  Furthermore,  the  American 
schools  and  colleges  actually  are  carrying  on  their  work  under  the 
new  regime.  Mr.  Albert  W.  Staub,  American  Director  of  the  Near 
East  Colleges,  wrote  last  autumn  from  Constantinople:  “On  account 
of  the  changes  that  have  taken  place  here,  it  was  generally  predicted 
that  the  enrollment  of  our  colleges  would  fall  off  considerably.  But 
with  the  return  of  peace  has  come  a new  confidence  in  the  future, 
as  the  increased  enrollment  above  that  of  last  year  would  indicate.” 
Robert  College  began  its  sixty-first  year  last  September  with  four 
hundred  and  fifty  students  of  nineteen  different  nationalities — Greeks, 
Turks,  Armenians  and  Bulgarians  leading  in  numbers.  Constanti- 
nople Woman’s  College  has  a registration  of  three  hundred  and  fifty, 
comprising  Moslem  and  Christian  students  of  fifteen  different  races 
or  nationalities.  The  Turks  declare  that  they  are  done  with  the 
Sultanate  and  the  Caliphate.  They  have  ahead  of  them  tremendous 
tasks  of  economic  reconstruction,  political  reorganization,  and  social 
readjustment.  To  insure  their  success,  they  need  the  sympathy  and 

18 


cooperation  of  those  Western  States  who  boast  of  greater  enlighten- 
ment. The  Turks  want  our  schools;  our  schools  want  to  stay  in 
Turkey. 

In  this  connection,  Dr.  James  L.  Barton,  Secretary  of  the  Ameri- 
can Board  of  Commissioners  for  Foreign  Missions,  wrote  the  De- 
partment of  State  on  November  24,  1923 : 

While  the  Treaty  does  not  contain  all  that  we  would  like,  yet  I am 
sure  I express  the  judgment  of  the  officers  of  the  American  Board  and, 
so  far  as  I know,  the  missionaries  both  on  the  field  and  here  at  home  when 
I say  that  it  is  our  earnest  hope  that  the  Treaty  will  be  ratified  by  the 
Senate  and  that  without  acrimonious  debate.  We  are  convinced  that  this  is 
the  best  Treaty  which  could  be  secured  under  the  circumstances,  and  that 
it  will  furnish  a basis  for  negotiations  and  for  securing  privileges  not 
covered  in  the  Treaty. 

If  the  Treaty  should  be  rejected,  I am  convinced  that  the  continuance 
of  American  institutions  in  Turkey  would  be  jeopardized.  Under  the 
Treaty  there  are  grounds  for  believing  that  they  will  be  permitted  to 
continue.  . . . There  are  indications  that  the  Government  will  look  with 
increasing  favor  upon  the  continuation  of  these  institutions  and  grant 
them  enlarging  privileges.  This  has  already  taken  place  in  Smyrna,  Tar- 
sus and  at  some  other  points. 

The  Problem  of  Minorities 

No  pledges  of  the  American  people  regarding  the  Armenians  or 
other  subjects  of  the  former  Ottoman  Empire  have  ever  been  in- 
corporated in  treaties  between  the  United  States  and  Turkey.  The 
United  States  was  not  a signatory  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  1856  or 
the  Treaty  of  Berlin  of  1878,  which  contained  elaborate  provisions 
for  the  protection  of  minorities  in  Turkey.  On  the  other  hand,  at 
various  times  the  Government  of  the  United  States  has  definitely 
taken  the  position  that  it  could  not  assume  responsibility  for  the  main- 
tenance of  internal  peace  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  beyond  safeguard- 
ing the  property  and  lives  of  American  citizens.  Our  policy  of  polit- 
ical isolation  was  departed  from  under  President  Wilson,  although 
even  under  his  administration  there  was  no  declaration  of  war  against 
Turkey — ^in  spite  of  keen  sympathy  for  the  Armenians — and  no 
American  participation  in  the  negotiations  leading  to  the  Treaty  of 
Sevres. 

Those  who  advocate  rejection  of  this  Treaty  on  the  ground  that 
it  does  not  provide  for  an  Armenian  Republic  or  for  the  adequate 
protection  of  minorities  in  Turkey,  overlook  the  obvious  fact  that  a 
treaty  which  obligated  the  United  States  to  any  such  policy  would 
meet  still  greater  opposition  from  the  advocates  of  political  isola- 
tion. The  Allied  Treaty  with  Turkey  contains  adequate  provisions 
for  the  preservation  of  the  liberties  of  minorities,  under  the  super- 

19 


vision  of  the  League  of  Nations.  If  the  isolationist  sentiment  can  be 
overcome,  the  best  manner  of  American  intervention  on  behalf  of  the 
Christian  subjects  of  Turkey  is  through  participation  in  the  League. 
If  isolationist  sentiment  cannot  be  overcome,  it  is  futile  to  talk  of 
defending  the  rights  of  minorities.  It  is  incumbent  upon  opponents 
of  the  Treaty  to  indicate  in  what  respect  its  rejection  would  provide 
for  the  establishment  of  an  Armenian  Republic  or  would  safeguard 
the  lives,  liberties  and  property  of  the  minorities  in  Thrace  and  Ana- 
tolia. It  would  be  nothing  short  of  criminal  to  incite  the  Armenians 
to  resist,  directly  or  indirectly,  the  settlement  reached  at  Lausanne  un- 
less we  are  prepared,  with  military  force  if  necessary,  to  support 
such  resistance. 

It  is  the  opinion  of  this  Committee  that  there  is  no  immediate 
prospect  of  an  American  offensive,  military  or  political,  to  settle  the 
minorities  problem.  In  1920,  we  flatly  refused  an  Armenian  man- 
date, at  a time  when  we  were  asked  only  to  assume  guardianship  for 
territory  under  the  military  subjection  of  the  Allies.  Short  of  a 
successful  armed  invasion  of  the  Anatolian  peninsula,  there  is  now 
no  way  we  can  achieve  what  we  then  refused  to  consider.  Ratifi- 
cation of  the  Treaty  with  Turkey,  however,  would  enable  our  ac- 
credited representatives  at  Angora  to  exercise  their  influence  on  be- 
half of  moderation  and  justice.  Furthermore,  we  should  remember 
that  ratification  of  the  Turco-American  Treaty  would  assist  in  making 
the  Peace  of  Lausanne  part  of  the  public  law  of  the  Near  East,  and 
the  Peace  of  Lausanne  is  more  specific  on  the  question  of  minorities 
than  any  other  previous  settlement  in  modern  history.  It  provides 
for  cooperative  action  on  behalf  of  subject  peoples  without  permitting 
the  arbitrary  intervention  of  any  single  power.  The  United  States 
retains  its  moral  right,  however,  to  interest  itself  in  behalf  of  op- 
pressed peoples. 

By  the  terms  of  the  Allied  Treaty  with  the  Turks  of  July  24, 
1923,  the  new  Turkish  Republic  extends  certain  guarantees  to  all 
nationals  of  Turkey  “without  distinction  of  birth,  nationality,  lan- 
guage, race  or  religion”;  equality  before  the  law  and  full  protection 
of  life,  liberty  and  property;  equal  civil  and  political  rights;  permis- 
sion to  establish,  maintain  and  control  religious,  philanthropic,  and 
social  institutions;  freedom  of  religion  and  unrestricted  use  of  the 
vernacular;  freedom  of  social  customs,  including  family  law  and  per- 
sonal status.  It  will  be  freely  charged,  of  course,  that  these  promises 
are  not  worth  the  paper  they  are  written  on — other  such  promises, 
albeit  not  so  far-reaching,  have  been  made  before.  In  this  connection 
it  is  well  to  quote  Article  XLIV  of  the  Allied-Turkish  Treaty: 


20 


ARTICLE  XLIV 

Turkey  agrees  that,  in  so  far  as  the  preceding  articles  of  this  sec- 
tion affect  non-Moslem  nationals  of  Turkey,  these  provisions  con- 
stitute obligations  of  internationdi  concern  and  shall  he  placed  under 
the  guarantee  of  the  League  of  Nations.  They  shall  not  he  modified 
without  the  assent  of  the  majority  of  the  Council  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  The  British  Empire,  France,  Italy  and  Japan  hereby  agree 
not  to  withhold  their  assent  to  any  modification  in  these  articles  which 
is  in  due  form  assented  to  by  a majority  of  the  Council  of  the  League 
of  Nations. 

Turkey  agrees  that  any  member  of  the  Council  of  the  League  of 
Nations  shall  have  the  right  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  Council 
any  infraction  or  danger  of  infraction  of  any  of  these  obligations, 
and  that  the  Council  may  thereupon  take  such  action  and  give  such 
directions  as  it  may  deem  proper  and  effective  in  the  circumstances. 

Turkey  further  agrees  that  any  difference  of  opinion  as  to  questions 
of  law  or  of  fact  arising  out  of  these  articles  between  the  Turkish 
Government  and  any  one  of  the  other  Signatory  Powers  or  any  other 
Power,  a member  of  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations,  shall  be 
held  to  be  a dispute  of  an  international  character  under  Article  XIV 
of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.  The  Turkish  Government 
hereby  consents  that  any  such  dispute  shall,  if  the  other  party  there- 
to demands,  be  referred  to  the  Permanent  Court  of  International 
Justice.  The  decision  of  the  Permanent  Court  shall  be  final  and 
shall  have  the  same  force  and  effect  as  an  award  under  Article  XIII  of 
the  Covenant. 

As  between  Greece  and  Turkey,  a solution  of  the  minorities  prob- 
lem was  attempted  by  a compulsory  interchange  of  populations.  This 
plan  was  the  intellectual  child  of  M.  Venizelos,  born  in  1913,  and 
adopted  by  Dr.  Fridtjof  Nansen  at  Lausanne  in  1923.  The  first  pro- 
posal for  an  interchange  of  populations  between  Greece  and  Turkey 
came  in  a letter  of  June  24,  1914,  from  M.  Venizelos  to  the  Sublime 
Porte,  which  subsequently  led  to  an  agreement  of  July  8,  1914.  This 
agreement  became  inoperative  because  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Great 
War  less  than  a month  later.  At  the  Paris  Conference  of  1919,  M. 
Venizelos  again  evidenced  his  enthusiasm  for  the  idea  of  inter-migra- 
tion of  dissatisfied  peoples  across  national  frontiers  by  negotiating  a 
treaty  providing  for  an  interchange  of  populations  as  between  Greece 
and  Bulgaria.  This  latter  interchange  was  carried  out  by  a mixed 
commission  on  which  Dr.  Nansen  represented  the  League  of  Nations. 
Even  as  late  as  1921,  the  Turks  did  not  contemplate  such  a move  and 
only  on  the  strenuous  advocacy  of  Dr.  Nansen  was  this  consum- 

21 


mated.^  He  became  so  convinced  of  the  wisdom  of  the  plan  under 
certain  conditions  that  he  requested  permission  to  appear  before  the 
Territorial  and  Military  Commission  of  the  Lausanne  Conference.  At 
the  meeting  of  this  Commission  on  December  1,  1922,  Dr.  Nansen 
made  an  impassioned  appeal  for  a compulsory  exchange  of  popula- 
tions between  Greece  and  Turkey  under  the  auspices  of  a mixed 
commission,  similar  to  that  which  had  supervised  the  Graeco-Bul- 
garian exchange.  His  proposals  were  well  received  and  subsequently 
incorporated  in  a convention  of  January  30,  1924,  between  Ismet 
Pasha  and  M.  Venizelos.’ 

It  will  be  objected  by  American  opponents  of  the  Treaty  that  paper 
guarantees  and  interchanges  of  population,  however  satisfactory  in 
themselves  do  not  solve  the  minorities  problem.  In  their  opinion  no 
settlement  should  be  ratified  which  does  not  provide  a national  home 
for  the  Armenian  people.  Upon  the  wisdom  of  establishing  an  Ar- 
menian Republic  on  territory  ceded  by  Turkey,  there  is  some  differ- 
ence of  opinion  in  this  Committee.  Upon  the  practicability  of  estab- 
lishing such  a Republic  at  the  present  time  there  is  unanimity  of  opinion. 
We  believe  that  we  can  not  render  a service  to  the  Armenian  people  by 
agitating  for  their  national  independence  at  this  time.  “If  we  wish  an  in- 
dependent Armenia,  we  must  go  in  and  fight  for  it ; the  Armenians  are 
too  few  to  win  it  for  themselves.  If  we  do  not  wish  to  fight  for  it,  we 
must  be  willing  to  see  the  Turk  remain  master  in  his  own  house,  (subject 
to  such  reasonable  restrictions  as  are  laid  down  for  him  in  the  afore- 
mentioned Article  XLIV  of  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne.)  It  is  the  most 
criminal  and  cowardly  form  of  betrayal  to  lead  the  Armenians  to 
believe  that  we  stand  ready  to  support  them  in  their  claim  for  inde- 
pendence when  we  know,  as  we  do  know,  that  we  shall  not  send 
troops  to  fight  for  it.  For  if  we  lead  the  Armenians  so  to  believe, 
they  will  attempt  to  rise  again  encouraged  by  the  belief.  If  they  do 
and  are  massacred  again,  the  guilt  will  be  not  theirs,  not  Turkey’s, 
but  ours.  The  sincerest  friendship  we  can  show  the  Armenians  now 
is  to  encourage  the  movement  for  rapprochement  (with  the  Turks).* 


1.  Precedents  for  interchange  of  populations;  (a)  Graeco-Turkish  Agreement  of  1914.  The 
idea  was  originally  that  of  M.  Venizelos.  Details  of  Greek  Government’s  'note  of  June 
24,  1914,  and  Turkish  reply  of  July  8,  1914,  are  given  in  Toynbee,  op.  cit.,  p.  141.  <b) 
One  of  the  innovations  attempted  by  the  Paris  Conference  was  “a  scheme  for  facilitating 
the  intermigration  of  dissatisfied  peoples  across  new  national  frontiers.”  Proposed  by 
M.  Venizelos,  incorporated  in  a treaty  between  Bulgaria  and  Greece,  and  supervised  by 
a mixed  commission  of  which  two  members  were  appointed  by  the  League.  M.  O.  Hud- 
son in  Seymour  and  House:  What  Really  Happened  at  Paris,  pp.  222-223. 

2.  See  Appendix  No.  1. 

3.  Maurice  Pernot  reports  the  following  conversation  with  a well-known  Armenian  In 
1921.  (See  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  April  15,  1922,  p,  925.)  The  Armenian  says; 

“The  Turks  are  too  feeble  in  number  and  en  valeur  to  keep  us  under  their  yoke. 
Alone  they  are  without  power,  but  they  know  and  we  know  too,  that  as  long  as  the 
rivalry  endures  between  any  two  of  the  great  powers,  one  of  these  will  always  be  found 
to  support  them  (the  Turks)  at  our  expense.  This  is  the  tragic  lot  of  the  Oriental  na- 
tions, who  left  to  themselves  would  probably  have  quarreled  and  fought  among  them- 
selves, but  who  certainly  would  have  come  to  an  understanding  with  each  other  In  the 
end.  All  hope  of  living  in  peace  with  each  other  disappeared  from  their  horizon  the 
day  when  they  saw  come  to  their  help  as  imperial  and  formidable  aids  the  great  ‘pro- 
tecting powers  of  the  West.’  ” 


22 


And  the  worst  betrayal  of  them  of  which  we  can  be  guilty  is  to  re- 
fuse, on  their  account,  to  ratify  the  Lausanne  Treaty.”^ 

The  establishment  of  an  independent  Armenia  being,  for  the  pres- 
ent at  least,  out  of  the  question,  the  best  course  we  can  pursue  is  the 
lending  of  our  support  to  the  minorities  provisions  of  the  Allied  treaty 
with  the  Turks.  For  the  moment,  all  we  can  do  is  to  give  moral  force 
to  the  Peace  of  Lausanne  by  the  ratification  of  our  own  Treaty.  Later, 
American  opinion  may  sanction  our  becoming  co-guarantor  with  the 
other  powers  of  the  rights  of  those  Armenians  who  remain  under 
Turkish  rule.  This  may  be  accomplished  by  American  signature  of 
the  Treaty  of  Lausanne  or  by  American  membership  in  the  League 
of  Nations.  It  can  not  be  achieved  by  mere  rejection  of  the  pending 
treaty. 

Shall  We  Have  Any  Treaty  With  the  Turks? 

Opponents  of  the  Turco- American  Treaty  must  justify  one  of  the 
following  courses  of  action  in  lieu  of  non-ratification  of  the  treaty : 

1.  War  with  Turkey,  which  is  unthinkable. 

2.  The  continuance  of  our  present  informal  diplomatic  relation- 
ships, by  which  the  United  States  is  represented  at  Constantinople  by 
a High  Commissioner  and  Turkey  is  represented  at  Washington  by 
the  Spanish  Minister.  This  course  is  impracticable  for  a long-con- 
tinued period. 

3.  The  severance  of  all  diplomatic  relationships  with  Turkey. 
Such  a course  of  action  would  be  suicidal.  If  the  objections  to  the 
present  Treaty  are  based  upon  alleged  failure  to  protect  American 
rights  in  Turkey,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  opponents  of  the  Treaty 
could  consistently  advocate  severance  of  diplomatic  relations,  which 
would  certainly  and  immediately  place  all  of  those  rights  in  jeopardy. 

4.  Insistence  upon  observance  by  Turkey  of  previous  treaties  be- 
tween the  Ottoman  Empire  and  the  United  States.  There  are  certain 
technical  arguments  which  might  be  advanced  to  prove  that  these 
treaties  are  even  now  inoperative.  Aside  from  such  considerations, 
however,  it  is  obvious  that  Turkey  will  refuse  to  recognize  many  of 
the  stipulations  of  our  treaties,  especially  such  as  are  concerned  with 
exterritorial  privileges.  In  the  last  analysis  we  can  not  safely  take 
our  stand  upon  the  treaties  of  1830  and  1874.  If,  for  example,  the 
Turks  should  arrest  an  American  citizen  and  try  him  in  a Turkish 
court  in  violation  of  our  alleged  treaty  rights,  we  should  then  be 
faced  with  the  following  dilemma:  To  despatch  an  ultimatum  to 
Turkey  and  fight  in  the  event  of  its  rejection,  or  to  accept  the  humili- 
ating position  of  standing  by  while  our  alleged  treaty  rights  were  be* 
ing  ignored. 


1.  New  Republic,  Feb.  20,  1924. 


28 


It  should  be  emphasized,  furthermore,  that  the  pursuance  of  any 
of  these  courses  of  action,  even  if  practicable,  would  serve  only  to 
prolong  a state  of  war  in  the  Near  East  and  thereby  to  visit  continued 
suffering  on  all  the  inhabitants — Christian  as  well  as  Moslem— of  the 
Near  East.  It  has  been  said  that  the  Government  of  Mustapha 
Kemal  is  facing  serious  domestic  difficulties  and  that  its  fall  is  im- 
minent as  a result  of  growing  conservative  opposition  and  impending 
economic  disaster.  Insofar  as  this  may  be  true  it  renders  the  more, 
rather  than  the  less,  urgent  the  ratification  of  the  pending  Treaty. 
If  the  Government  of  Mustapha  Kemal  fails,  it  may  be  superseded 
by  one  based  upon  unfortunate  traditions  of  political  opportunism 
and  dependent  upon  reactionary  Moslem  support.  Or  it  may  be  fol- 
lowed by  no  government  at  all.  But  it  is  self-deception  to  contend 
that  any  new  Turkish  administration  will  deal  with  the  United  States 
in  a more  friendly  spirit  or  upon  more  favorable  terms  to  us.  In 
this  connection  it  is  well  to  consider  our  experiences  with  Mexico  and 
to  remember  that  American  recognition  of  Obregon  came  almost  too 
late  to  secure  the  fruits  of  recognition.  What  good  purpose  would  be 
served  by  the  development  of  a similar  situation  in  Turkey? 

In  the  interests  of  all  the  Near  Eastern  peoples  we  should  do  every- 
thing we  can  to  promote  law  and  order,  not  anarchy  and  chaos,  in 
Turkey  and  Greece.  An  immediate  and  practical  tender  of  Christian 
charity  and  good  will  to  Turkey  will  promote  respect  for  Chris- 
tians and  Christianity  throughout  the  Moslem  world.  It  would 
be  tragic  indeed  if  liberal  American  opinion  were  to  allow  partisan 
politics,  religious  bigotry,  hoary  prejudices,  false  national  pride,  or 
any  other  such  considerations  to  stand  in  the  way  of  benevolent  neu- 
trality towards  those  who  are  attempting  the  colossal  task  of  building 
a new  Turkey  on  the  ruins  of  an  evil  imperial  regime.  It  would  be 
a sad  commentary  upon  Western  civilization  if  the  present  efforts 
toward  reform  in  Turkey  should  be  sabotaged,  as  was  the  Young 
Turk  Revolution  of  1908-1909,  by  the  unsympathetic  attitude  of  the 
Great  Powers. 

In  all  statements  of  opposition  to  the  ratification  of  the  Turco- 
American  Treaty  there  is  a decided  strain  to  the  effect  that  the  Turk 
is  the  same  old  Turk — “a  red-handed  tyrant,  an  incorrigible  bar- 
barian,”— whose  pledged  word  is  worthless.  If  this  traditional,  but 
distorted,  picture  of  the  Turk  be  a correct  portrayal  of  the  present 
government  at  Angora,  then  the  opposition  is  not  to  this  Treaty,  but 
to  any  treaty  with  Turkey.  If  Turkish  promises  in  any  case  must  be 
considered  unreliable,  even  the  most  perfect  of  treaties  would  be  value- 
less, and  the  only  permanent  solution  of  the  Near  Eastern  problem 
would  be  the  extermination  of  the  Turkish  people.  In  our  judg- 


24 


ment,  however,  this  premise  is  untenable.  We  believe  that  there  are 
hopeful  signs  that  the  Turks  can  and  will  reform  their  political,  so- 
cial and  economic  institutions  if  they  are  allowed  reasonable  oppor- 
tunities to  work  out  their  own  salvation. 

The  record  of  the  present  government  of  Turkey  from  1919  to 
1922  must  be  judged  with  some  consideration  of  the  fact  that  Turkey 
was  a besieged  and  desperate  nation  fighting  for  the  right  to  live. 
Since  the  Mudania  Armistice  the  Turks  have  settled  down  to  the 
tremendous  task  of  reconstruction  and  have,  on  the  whole,  behaved 
with  dignity  and  restraint.  The  attention  which  they  have  paid  to 
economic  problems  is  one  of  the  most  hopeful  signs  that  have  ever 
come  out  of  Turkey.'  Encouragement  has  been  given  to  the  move- 
ment for  the  emancipation  of  women  from  the  veil  and  the  harem. 
There  has  been  no  repudiation  of  debts  and  no  fantastic  inflation  of 
the  currency.  Foreign  property  has  been  respected ; American 
schools,  missions,  and  hospitals  temporarily  closed  by  local  authori- 
ties were  re-opened  under  orders  from  the  central  Government.  Turk- 
ish authorities  in  Thrace  and  Constantinople  have  recently  been 
showing  a more  friendly  spirit  toward  Greece  in  the  solution  of  many 
delicate  problems  connected  with  execution  of  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne. 
The  recent  abolition  of  the  Caliphate,  carried  out  in  accord  with  the 
Western  tenet  of  separation  of  Church  and  State,  was  a drastic  move 
against  conservative  Moslems  who  objected  to  legislation  designed  to 
abandon  the  privileged  political  position  heretofore  enjoyed  by  Mo- 
hammedan Turks  as  compared  with  their  Christian  and  Jewish  fel- 
low-nationals. Mr.  Albert  Staub,  American  Director  of  the  Near 
East  Colleges,  has  stated  recently  after  an  extended  tour  of  investi- 
gation in  Turkey  that  the  doctrine  of  self-determination  “has  started 
a revolution  in  that  part  of  the  world  of  which  we  are  seeing  only 
the  beginning,”  and  he  prophesies  “great  things”  as  a result  of  the 
changed  national,  social,  and  economic  ideas  of  the  people.  It  is  a 
popularly  accepted  dogma,  but  not  an  established  fact,  that  the  Turks 
are  incapable  of  change. 

Whatever  may  be  their  record  as  regards  other  nations,  the  Turks 
are  friendly  to  the  United  States  and  desire  American  friendship. 
They  have  made  sacrifices  to  retain  it  under  conditions  more  trying 
than  the  present.  From  the  time  of  our  entry  into  the  Great  War  until 
the  Armistice,  American  lives  and  property  in  the  Near  East  were 
wholly  at  the  mercy  of  the  Turks.  But  American  lives  were  pro- 
tected, American  property  was  kept  inviolate,  and  American  schools 
and  colleges  outside  the  war  zone  continued  their  work  unmolested. 

1.  During  the  last  part  of  February,  1923,  an  economic  congress  was  held  at  Smyrna 
which  passed  a so-called  "Economic  Pact’’  consisting  of  twelve  articles  of  faith.  These 
stress  Turkish  independence  and  sovereignty  and  the  importance  of  the  consumption  of 
home  products.  Levant  Trade  Review,  April.  1923,  pp.  210-216. 

25 


This  fact  is  of  great  significance  in  the  present  discussion,  when  the 
Turks  are  so  freely  charged  with  ill  will  and  bad  faith. 

Ratification  of  the  Turco- American  Treaty  would  no  more  condone 
past  acts  of  violence  on  the  part  of  the  Turks  than  assistance  to  Greek 
refugees  condoned  atrocities  committed  by  the  Greek  armies  in  Ana- 
tolia. It  merely  gives  Americans  the  opportunity  to  play  a part  in 
the  economic  and  social  reconstruction  of  a war-ridden  country. 
What  is  asked  for  the  Turks  should  be  demanded  for  every  other 
Near  Eastern  people.  The  tragedy  of  the  Armenians  is  one  which 
Americans  can  and  should  do  much  to  mitigate.  The  Greek  people, 
worn  out  as  a result  of  an  ill-advised  military  venture,  taxed  to  the 
breaking-point,  victimized  by  a series  of  political  revolutions,  likewise 
need  American  support  and  generous  financial  assistance. 

It  is  the  judgment  of  this  Committee  that  the  greatest  service  which 
Americans  can  render  in  the  Near  East  is  to  heal  an  old  wound,  to  cure 
not  to  condemn,  to  conciliate  not  to  accentuate  racial  and  religious  ani- 
mosities. 


Philip  Marshall  Brown, 
Samuel  McCrea  Cavert, 
Jackson  Fleming, 

Barnette  Miller, 

Laurence  Moore, 

E.  E.  Pratt, 

W.  L.  Westermann, 

Edward  Mead  Earle,  Chairman. 


APPENDIX 

COMPULSORY  exchange  of  populations  between  Greece  and  Tur- 
key, in  accordance  with  their  Convention  of  January  30,  1923, 
signed  at  Lausanne  and  subsequently  attached  to  the  Treaty  as  part  of 
the  Peace  of  Lausanne,  July  24,  1923 : 

1.  The  proposal  for  a compulsory  exchange  of  populations  originates  with 
Dr.  Nansen,  in  a statement  to  the  Territorial  and  Military  Commission 
of  the  Lausanne  Conference,  meeting  December  1,  1922.  Introduced 
under  the  heading  of . repatriation  of  prisoners.  Not  on  agenda.  (See 
Proceedings,  pp.  111-124.) 

(a)  Based  upon  the  precedent  of  an  exchange  of  Greek  and  Bulgarian 
populations  under  the  supervision  of  a mixed  commission,  two  of 
the  four  members  of  which  were  designated  by  the  Council  of 
the  League  of  Nations. 

(b)  Based,  also,  upon  the  previous  approval  of  all  the  Governments 
represented  at  the  Lausanne  Conference. 

(c)  “I  do  not  pretend,”  said  Dr.  Nansen,  “that  the  question  is  not  full 
of  grave  difficulties.  Anyone  who  has  reflected  upon  what  is  in- 
volved in  the  displacem.ent  of  populations  of  many  more  than  a 
million  people,  in  uprooting  these  people  from  their  homes,  trans- 
ferring them  to  a strange  new  country,  in  registering,  valuing 
and  liquidating  their  individual  property  which  they  abandon,  and 
in  securing  to  them  the  payment  of  their  just  claims  to  the  value 
of  this  property,  will  understand  that  the  difficulties  are  immense. 

. . . Any  exchange  of  populations,  however  well  it  were  carried 
out,  must  impose  very  considerable  hardships,  perhaps  very  con- 
siderable impoverishment,  upon  great  numbers  of  the  citizens  of 
the  two  countries  who  are  exchanged.”  Proceedings,  pp.  114-115. 

(d)  “But  these  hardships,  great  though  they  may  be,  will  be  less  than 
the  hardships  which  will  result  for  these  same  populations  if  noth- 
ing is  done.  ...  I know  that  the  Governments  of  the  Great 
Powers  are  in  favor  of  this  proposal  because  they  believe  that 
to  unmix  the  populations  of  the  Near  East  will  tend  to  secure  the 
true  pacification  of  the  Near  East  and  because  they  believe  an 
exchange  of  populations  is  the  quickest  and  most  efficacious  way 
of  dealing  with  the  grave  economic  results  which  must  result  from 
the  great  movement  of  populations  which  has  already  occurred 
. . . My  experience  of  the  past  two  months  with  the  Graeco-Bul- 
garian Commission  and  the  very  careful  enquiries  which  I have 
made  and  the  consideration  which  I have  given  to  the  whole  sub- 
ject have  also  brought  me  to  believe  that  on  its  own  merits  the 
proposal  for  an  exchange  is  one  which  is  highly  desirable  in  the 
interests  of  the  countries  principally  concerned  and  in  the  interests 
of  the  peace  of  Europe.”  Ibid. 

2.  The  economic  grounds  for  the  exchange  of  populations : 

(a)  “There  have  been  already  very  great  displacements  of  popula- 
tions; almost  one  million  people  have  left  their  homes  in  one  coun- 
try and  flocked  into  the  territories  of  the  other.  They  have  left 
their  productive  employment  in  Turkey  and  are  without  possi- 


27 


bility  of  securing  other  productive  employment  in  Greece.”  This 
condition  may  be  remedied  by  an  exchange  of  populations.  “Such 
an  exchange  will  provide  Turkey  immediately  and  in  the  best 
possible  conditions  with  the  population  necessary  to  continue  the 
exploitation  of  the  cultivated  lands  which  the  departed  Greek 
populations  have  abandoned.  The  departure  from  Greece  of  its 
Moslem  citizens  would  create  the  possibility  of  rendering  self- 
supporting  a great  proportion  of  the  refugees  now  concentrated 
in  the  towns  and  in  different  parts  of  Greece.”  Ibid  p.  115. 

3.  Summary  of  the  Graeco-Turkish  Convention  for  the  interchange  of  popu- 
lations : 

(a)  Interchange  of  nationals  and  liquidation  of  their  property  to  be 
supervised  by  a mixed  commission,  “consisting  of  four  members 
representing  each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  and  of  three 
members  chosen  by  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  from 
among  nationals  of  Powers  which  did  not  take  part  in  the  war 
of  1914-1918.” 

(b)  Provides  for  “a  compulsory  exchange  of  Turkish  nationals  of 
the  Greek  Orthodox  religion  established  in  Turkish  territory, 
and  of  Greek  nationals  of  the  Moslem  religion  established  in 
Greek  territory,”  with  the  exception  of  the  Greek  inhabitants  of 
Constantinople  and  Moslem  inhabitants  of  Western  Thrace. 

(c)  Property  of  these  involuntary  emigrants  (except  such  property 
as  they  may  choose  to  take  with  them)  shall  be  liquidated  by  the 
Mixed  Commission.  Sums  due  as  the  result  of  such  liquidation 
“shall  constitute  a Government  debt  from  the  country  where  the 
liquidation  takes  place  to  the  Government  of  the  country  to  which 
the  emigrant  belongs.  The  emigrant  shall  in  principle  be  entitled 
to  receive  in  the  country  to  which  he  emigrates,  as  representing 
the  sums  due  to  him,  property  of  a value  equal  to  and  of  the  same 
nature  as  that  which  he  has  left  behind.”  Article  15. 


Text  of  the  Official  Summary  of  the  Lausanne  Treaty 

Preamble. — The  purpose  of  the  Treaty  is  to  regulate  the  conditions  of  inter- 
course between  the  United  States  and  Turkey  and  to  define  the  rights  of  their 
respective  nationals  in  the  territory  of  the  other  in  accordance  with  the  principles 
of  international  law  and  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity. 

Article  1. — Most-favored-nation  treatment  is  accorded  to  the  diplomatic  of- 
ficers of  the  two  countries. 

Article  2. — Provides  for  the  abrogation  of  the  capitulations  relating  to  the 
regime  of  foreigners  in  Turkey,  both  as  regards  conditions  of  entry  and  resi- 
dence and  as  regards  fiscal  and  judicial  questions. 

Article  3. — Nationals  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  have  full  liberty  of  entry, 
travel  and  residence  upon  conforming  to  the  laws  of  the  country,  and  shall  enjoy 
protection  in  conformity  with  international  law.  Their  property  shall  not  be  taken 
without  due  process  of  law  or  without  indemnity. 

28 


They  may,  under  the  local  laws  and  regulations  in  force,  engage  in  every  kind 
of  profession,  commerce,  etc.,  not  forbidden  by  law  to  all  foreigners.  They  shall 
have  the  right  to  possess  and  dispose  of  all  kinds  of  movable  property  on  a foot- 
ing of  equality  with  the  nationals  of  the  country.  As  regards  immovable  property, 
the  nationals  of  each  country  shall,  in  the  territory  of  the  other,  enjoy  the  treat- 
ment generally  accorded  to  foreigners  by  the  laws  of  the  place  where  the  property 
is  situated,  subject  to  reciprocity.  They  may  own,  lease  and  construct  buildings 
for  residential  purposes  or  any  other  purpose  permitted  by  the  present  Treaty. 
Upon  conforming  to  the  laws  they  shall  enjoy  liberty  of  conscience  and  worship 
and  shall,  equally  with  the  nationals  of  the  country,  have  free  access  to  the 
tribunals. 

Article  4. — Commercial,  industrial  and  financial  companies  and  associations,  or- 
ganized under  the  laws  of  the  United  States  and  Turkey  and  maintaining  head 
offices  in  the  country  in  which  they  are  organized,  shall  be  recognized  by  the  other 
country  provided  they  pursue  no  aims  contrary  to  its  laws.  They  shall  be  entitled 
to  the  same  protection  as  that  accorded  to  nationals  in  Article  3.  Subject  to  the 
applicable  laws  they  shall  have  free  access  to  the  courts.  Such  companies  and  as- 
sociations shall,  subject  to  the  laws  in  force  in  the  country,  have  the  right  to 
acquire,  possess  and  dispose  of  every  kind  of  movable  property.  As  regards  im- 
movable property  and  the  right  to  engage  in  commerce  and  industry,  such  com- 
panies shall  enjoy,  on  condition  of  reciprocity,  the  treatment  generally  accorded  by 
the  laws  in  the  locality  where  such  companies  are  constituted.  They  shall  be  able 
freely  to  carry  on  their  activities  subject  to  the  requirements  of  public  order. 

Article  S. — Domiciliary  visits  and  searches  of  dwellings,  warehouses,  factories, 
etc.,  of  nationals  or  companies,  as  well  as  the  inspection  of  books,  accounts,  etc., 
shall  take  place  only  under  the  conditions  and  in  the  form  prescribed  by  the  laws 
with  respect  to  the  nationals  of  the  country. 

Article  6. — The  nationals  of  one  country  in  the  territory  of  the  other  shall  not 
be  subject  to  military  service  and  both  individuals  and  companies  shall  be  exempt 
from  forced  loans  or  other  exceptional  levies  on  property. 

Article  7. — The  nationals  of  each  country  shall  be  accorded,  in  the  territory 
of  the  other,  the  same  treatment  as  natives  in  all  matters  concerning  the  collection 
of  taxes,  imposts  and  other  charges.  The  companies  mentioned  in  Article  4 shall, 
on  condition  of  reciprocity,  enjoy  the  same  treatment  as  any  similar  foreign  com- 
pany. But  this  Article  does  not  apply  to  exemption  from  taxes,  etc.,  accorded 
to  State  institutions  or  to  concessionaires  of  a public  utility. 

Article  8. — In  matters  of  personal  status  and  family  law  (e.  g.,  marriage, 
divorce,  dowry,  adoption,  etc.,)  and,  as  regards  movable  property,  the  law  of  suc- 
cession, liquidation,  etc.,  citizens  of  the  United  States  in  Turkey  shall  be  subject 
exclusively  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  tribunals  or  other  national  authorities  of  the 
United  States  sitting  outside  of  Turkey.  This  does  not  affect  the  special  rights  of 
consuls  in  matters  of  civil  status  under  international  law,  or  special  agreements, 
nor  does  it  preclude  the  Turkish  tribunals  from  requiring  proof  regarding  mat- 
ters coming  within  the  competence  of  the  national  tribunals  of  the  interested 
parties.  Turkish  tribunals  may  also  have  jurisdiction  in  the  above-mentioned 
cases  provided  all  interested  parties  submit  thereto  in  writing. 

Article  9. — Provides  for  freedom  of  commerce  and  navigation  between  the 
two  countries  upon  most-favored-nation  treatment,  subject  to  sanitary,  police  and 
customs  regulations.  The  merchant  ships  of  the  two  countries  shall  not  be  sub- 


29 


jected  to  higher  tonnage  dues  or  port  charges  than  national  vessels.  However, 
this  Article  and  other  provisions  in  the  Treaty  do  not  apply  to  the  coastwise  trade. 

Article  10. — Merchant  and  war  vessels  and  aircraft  of  the  United  States  enjoy 
complete  liberty  of  navigation  and  passage  in  the  Dardanelles,  the  Sea  of  Marmora 
and  the  Bosphorus  on  a basis  of  equality  with  similar  craft  of  the  most  favored 
nation,  subject  to  the  rules  relating  to  such  navigation  and  passage  of  the  Straits 
Convention  of  Lausanne  of  July  24,  1923. 

Article  11. — Most-favored-nation  treatment  as  regards  import  duties  is  ac- 
corded to  articles  exported  from  one  country  to  the  other,  and  no  export  duty 
is  to  be  levied  higher  than  that  imposed  upon  similar  articles  exported  to  any 
other  foreign  country.  No  prohibition  or  restriction  shall  be  imposed  upon  the 
importation  or  exportation  of  an  article  which  is  not  equally  applied  to  those  of 
the  most  favored  nation.  Vessels  and  goods  of  the  two  countries  shall  be  ac- 
corded the  same  facilities  accorded  to  those  of  a third  country,  irrespective  of  any 
favors  granted  by  the  third  State  in  return  for  special  treatment.  This  Article 
does  not  apply  to  the  commerce  between  the  United  States  and  Cuba  and  the 
Panama  Canal  Zone,  nor  to  special  arrangements  between  Turkey  and  the  coun- 
tries detached  from  the  Ottoman  Empire  since  1914. 

Article  12. — Most- favored-nation  treatment  is  provided  as  regards  the  collec- 
tion of  consumption,  excise,  octroi  and  other  local  taxes  on  merchandise. 

Article  13. — Most-favored-nation  treatment  is  accorded  all  merchandise  as  re- 
gards transit  warehousing,  drawbacks,  etc. 

Article  14. — No  dues  for  tonnage,  harbor,  pilotage,  etc.,  shall  be  levied  on  any 
vessel  which  are  not  equally  levied  on  national  vessels. 

Article  15. — Any  vessel  carrying  papers  required  by  its  laws  shall  be  deemed 
to  be  a vessel  of  the  country  whose  flag  it  flies. 

Article  16. — Most-favored-nation  treatment  is  accorded  regarding  patents, 
trade-marks,  etc. 

Articles  17  to  26  define  in  detail  the  rights  and  duties  of  consular  officers. 

Article  27. — Provides  for  the  protection  of  shipwrecked  vessels  and  the  oper- 
ations of  salvage. 

Article  28. — For  the  purpose  of  the  present  Treaty  the  territories  of  the  two 
countries  are  considered  to  comprise  all  land,  water  and  air  over  which  sovereignty 
is  exercised,  except  the  Panama  Canal  Zone. 

Article  29. — No  taxes  are  to  be  collected  from  American  citizens  for  any  tax- 
able periods  prior  to  the  fiscal  year  1922-23  which,  under  the  laws  in  force  on 
August  1,  1914,  were  not  applicable  to  them.  Any  taxes  collected  after  May  15, 
1923,  on  periods  prior  to  the  fiscal  year  1922  will  be  returned,  but  no  taxes  col- 
lected before  May  15,  1923,  for  periods  prior  to  May  15,  1923,  will  be  returned. 

Article  30. — Alt  previous  treaties  between  the  United  States  and  Turkey  are 
abrogated.  A new  Extradition  Treaty  is  to  replace  the  one  of  1874. 

Article  31. — The  Treaty  shall  come  into  force  two  months  after  the  exchange 
of  ratifications.  Articles  1 and  2 shall  be  permanent.  Articles  3,  4,  5,  6,  7 and  8 
shall  be  for  the  duration  of  seven  years,  while  Articles  9 to  28  shall  remain  in 
force  for  five  years.  If  neither  country  notifies  the  other  six  months  before  the 
expiration  of  these  periods  of  its  intention  to  denounce  any  of  the  Articles  in 


30 


question,  they  shall  remain  in  force  until  the  expiration  of  a period  of  six  months 
from  the  date  on  which  they  shall  have  been  denounced. 

Article  32. — The  French,  English  and  Turkish  text  of  this  Treaty  shall  be 
ratified.  In  case  of  differences  the  French  text  shall  prevail.  Ratifications  are  to 
be  exchanged  at  Constantinople  as  soon  as  possible. 


As  agreement  was  not  reached  with  regard  to  the  manner  of  settlement 
of  claims  against  the  respective  Governments,  Mr.  Grew  exchanged 
communications  with  Ismet  Pasha  which  provided  for  further  consider- 
ations of  this  question  at  an  early  date  and  reserved  the  right  of  the  two 
Governments  to  withhold  ratification  of  the  treaties  until  an  accord  on 
the  point  has  been  reached. 


SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY  ON  THE  NEAR  EAST 

The  following  is  not  intended  as  a complete  bibliography  but  as  one 
which  in  general  presents  the  point  of  view  of  the  members  of  the  Com- 
mittee : 

Documents 

HARBORD,  MAJOR  GENERAL  JAMES  G.  Report  of  the  American  Mili- 
tary Mission  to  Armenia.  October,  1919.  Senate  Document  No.  266,  66th 
Congress,  1st  Session. 

LAUSANNE  CONFERENCE  ON  NEAR  EASTERN  AFFAIRS,  1922-1923. 
Records  of  Proceedings  and  Draft  Terms  of  Peace.  Cmd.  1814,  Turkey 
No.  1,  British  Blue  Book,  London,  1923. 

MALLOY.  Treaties,  Conventions  and  International  Acts,  Protocols  and  Agree- 
ments between  the  United  States  of  America  and  Other  Powers.  2 vols. 
61st  Congress,  2nd  Session.  Senate  Document  No.  357,  Washington,  1910. 

PAPERS  RELATING  TO  THE  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  1914. 

REPORT  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  COMMISSION  TO  INQUIRE 
INTO  THE  CAUSES  AND  CONDUCT  OF  THE  BALKAN  WARS. 
Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  New  York,  1914. 

Secondary  Material 

ABBOTT,  G.  F.  Greece  and  the  Allies,  1914-1922.  London,  1922. 

ABBOTT,  G.  F.  Turkey,  Greece  and  the  Great  Powers.  London,  1922. 

BROWN,  PHILIP  MARSHALL.  Foreigners  in  Turkey;  their  Juridical  Status. 
Princeton  University  Press,  Princeton,  N.  J.,  1914. 

DURHAM,  MARY  E.  Twenty  Years  of  the  Balkan  Tangle.  New  York,  1920. 

EARLE,  EDWARD  M.  Turkey,  the  Great  Powers  and  the  Bagdad  Railway. 
New  York,  1923. 

HOUSE,  EDWARD  M.,  and  SEYMOUR,  CHARLES  (editors).  What  Really 
Happened  at  Paris;  the  Story  of  the  Peace  Conference,  1918-1919,  by' 
American  Delegates.  New  York,  1921. 

JOHNSON,  CLARENCE  R.  (editor).  Constantinople  To-day.  New  York,  1923. 

31 


LODER,  A.  DE  V.  The  Truth  About  Mesopotamia,  Palestine,  Syria.  London, 
1923. 

PERNOT,  MAURICE.  La  Question  Turque.  Paris,  1923. 

POWELL,  ALEXANDER.  The  Struggle  for  Power  in  Moslem  Asia.  New 
York,  1923.  < 

SCHEVILL,  FERDINAND.  The  Balkan  Peninsula.  New  York,  1922. 

TOYNBEE,  A.  J.  The  Western  Question  in  Greece  and  Turkey.  Boston  and 
New  York,  1922. 


Periodicals 

AMERICAN  ACADEMY  OF  POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE. 
Annals,  vol.  108,  July,  1923,  Barnette  Miller,  The  New  Turkey. 

ASIA.  May,  1924.  W.  L.  Westermann,  The  Abolition  of  the  Ottoman  Phantom 
Caliphate. 

ATLANTIC  MONTHLY.  August,  1923.  Turkey  and  the  East,  by  an  Ob- 
server. 

CURRENT  HISTORY.  February,  1924.  A.  H.  Lybyer,  America’s  Missionary 
Record  in  Turkey. 

EDITOR  AND  PUBLISHER.  December  2,  1922.  Supplement.  King-Crane 
Report. 

FOREIGN  AFFAIRS.  June,  1923.  Philip  Marshall  Brown,  The  Capitula- 
tions. 

FORTNIGHTLY  REVIEW  (London).  September,  1923,  to  March,  1924.  Series 
of  articles  on  the  Near  East,  by  H.  Charles  Woods. 

i 

Lausanne  and  its  Antecedents,  January,  1923.  i 

The  Straits  Before  and  After,  February,  1923. 

Lord  Curzon  and  Lausanne,  March,  1923. 

Lausanne  and  its  Accessories,  July,  1923. 

Bulgarian  Revolution,  August,  1923. 

New  Turkey,  September,  1923. 

JOURNAL  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW.  Supplement.  January  and  April, 
1924.  (1)  Treaty  of  Peace  with  Turkey;  (2)  Tripartite  Agreement  Be- 

tween the  British  Empire,  France  and  Italy  Respecting  Anatolia.  Signed 
at  Sevres,  August  10,  1920. 

THE  LAUSANNE  TREATY:  SHOULD  THE  UNITED  STATES  RATIFY 
IT?  Foreign  Policy  Association,  Pamphlet  No.  26,  New  York,  April  5, 
1924. 

LEVANT  TRADE  REVIEW.  April,  1923. 

NATION  (New  York).  January  23,  1924.  Edward  M.  Earle,  Ratify  the  Turk- 
ish Treaty. 

NORTH  AMERICAN  REVIEW.  June,  1923.  The  United  States  and  the 
New  Turkey,  by  A.  L.  P.  Dennis. 

OUR  WORLD.  July,  1923.  Caleb  F.  Gates,  American  Schools  in  New  Turkey. 


